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Abstract 
           Nowadays teams are used in almost any organization as they are able to respond 
adequately to the changes from the business environment. Thus, the focus of this thesis is to 
analyse team working thoroughly by looking at individual team members satisfaction, 
behaviour and career prospects. Only by investigating first the individuals we can get a proper 
picture of how the team is functioning as the sum of individual efforts, commitment and 
relationships among group members shape the actual team. Which are the compensation 
schemes preferred by the employees? Are there any other types of non-monetary rewards that 
contribute to higher satisfaction or helping behaviour? And does it really payoff to be part of 
a team in terms of increase cooperation among group members and potential promotions? 
These are the research questions that I plan to answer in my dissertation. 
            In the specific case of human resource management it is proper for companies to adapt 
their compensation systems to their team-based structures (Zobal, 1998; Shaw et al., 2001). 
However, there are few studies about the effect of the new compensation design on employee 
satisfaction and helping behaviour. In line with equity theory and theory of cooperation it is 
important to investigate which other variables that managers can control influence team 
members satisfaction and cooperation. However, most prior research has studied the 
relationship between perceived fairness with pay and job satisfaction (Donovan, Drasgow & 
Munson, 1998; Masterson et al. 2000; Haar & Spell, 2009; Casuneanu, 2010) but little is 
known about the specific effects of different types of compensation applied on team member 
satisfaction and citizenship behaviour.  
          Another variable considered to influence satisfaction and other positive work-related 
attitudes (i.e.cooperation), is autonomy, regarded by the literature as a non-monetary reward 
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(Lawler, 1971). Nevertheless, previous research was either theoretical (Predergast, 2002; 
Raith, 2008) or considered autonomy at individual level (Karasek, 1979; Ortega, 2009). 
Given that there are few studies that take into account the influence of autonomy at team level 
the focus of this thesis is to study the effects of both individual and team-based autonomy on 
employee behaviour, satisfaction and career prospects. The contribution of this dissertation 
resides also in the introduction of both types of autonomy which are explored in detail and 
expected to work like a buffer that compensates for potential injustices of the reward system.  
           While team working has proved to have advantages for productivity (Gomez-Mejia & 
Balkin, 1989; Hamilton, Nickerson & Owan, 2003), cooperation (Miller and Hamblin; 1963; 
Van der Vegt et al., 2003; Bamberger & Levi, 2009) and knowledge sharing (Siemsen, 
Balasubramanian & Roth, 2007) its effects on career advancement prospects received little 
attention. Furthermore and in line with employee learning theory and previous career 
development literature, the connection between productivity and promotion has been studied 
but the complex set of variables (at individual and group level) that affects advancement 
beyond this needs further investigation.  
        The data that I use in this thesis comes from the fourth European Working Conditions 
Survey conducted in 2005 by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions1. This survey provides an analysis of working conditions in the 27 
countries of the European Union, in the two candidate countries (Turkey and Croatia), in 
Switzerland and Norway. In total, nearly 30.000 individual workers were interviewed in 
face-to-face interviews in their own homes between September and November of 2005, but I 
kept mainly the observations referring to employees working in a team.  
                                                             
1 The source of the survey that provided my data it is available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys and it is based on a questionnaire containing a core of 
common questions, allowing meaningful comparisons to be made between this survey and previous 
editions. All interviews were conducted face-to-face in the respondent’s own household; this was selected 
by starting from an assigned address and following a random walk procedure. 
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       The focus of this thesis is the team member given that it is essential to understand 
individual behavior and expectations in order to understand work groups. Once inside the 
team, individual satisfaction, cooperation and career opportunities have to be carefully 
looked at, as through a microscope, in order to analyze the underlying factors which 
influence them. I attempt to address this central theme through three essays, each one 
exploring a different research question and using the same dataset described above. 
 
      Chapter 1 entitled The Antecedents of Satisfaction with Pay in Teams: Do 
Performance-based Compensation and Autonomy Keep Team-members Satisfied? aims 
to investigate the effects performance-based compensation and autonomy on 
satisfaction with pay in the context of team working. Given that previous literature 
suggests that organizations using team working should also change their compensation 
system accordingly, I aim at developing a complex perspective that considers the 
influence of different monetary and non-monetary rewards on satisfaction with pay. 
Drawing from agency theory, equity theory and theory of cooperation I predict that both 
piece rates and team-based rewards are associated with higher pay satisfaction. 
Moreover, I claim that autonomy in the form of both individual and team-based 
contribute to increased satisfaction with pay.  Using a cross-sectional dataset of 
randomly selected European employees who are asked about specific working and 
living conditions, results confirm that both productivity based rewards and autonomy 
are important tools when it comes to determining employee satisfaction. Managers 
should know when to introduce rewards based only on individual merits so as to keep 
their workers motivated and when to give use autonomy as a buffer to compensate for 
potential fairness lacks in the payment system.  
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      In Chapter 2 entitled The Determinants of Helping Behavior in Teams I address the 
antecedents of helping behaviour in teams by looking at performance based 
compensation and autonomy. Given that previous literature has mainly examined each 
determinant separately, I aim at developing a complex perspective that considers their 
effect simultaneously. Using agency theory, social exchange theory and the theory of 
cooperation, I predict that piece rates and individual productivity payments decrease 
cooperation while and empowerment, at both individual and team level, leads to more 
helping behavior. This paper measures helping behaviour through the degree of 
assistance received by a team-member from other colleagues. We assume that workers 
receive help-from somebody else who may be called the good Samaritan- in two cases: 
first, when somebody else has something to gain if he or she offers help (for instance 
higher common reward or the perspective of receiving help himself) and second, when 
somebody else wants to help only because he or she can, this person being the Good 
Samaritan. I claim that a potential explanation that goes beyond compensation and 
autonomy refers to altruistic behaviour. Results yield support for the majority of the 
hypotheses confirming that managers could control their employees through either the 
compensation system or through autonomy in order to determine them to assist others. 
Practical implications are also identified and new directions for further research are 
proposed.  
    In Chapter 3 entitled Team Participation and Career Advancement I study the relationship 
between team affiliation and career advancement. Given that previous literature has mainly 
examined the connection between productivity and promotion, it is interesting to analyze the 
complex set of variables that affect career prospects beyond this. Drawing from employee 
learning and career development literature I aim at investigating both the antecedents and 
consequences of team affiliation. I claim that both the level of education and tenure are 
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associated with team participation while inside the group, together with individual and team-
based autonomy, they lead to high career advancement prospects. The findings suggest that 
managers may prefer to select in teams employees who are highly educated or have a large history 
and experience with the organization and once inside the team, team affiliation, individual 
autonomy, higher education and team discretion in the form of team freedom over the choice 
of the group leader contribute to high career prospects as expected. The implication regarding 
attaining further education is in line with findings from Arrow (1972), Spilerman & Lunde 
(1991) and Chao & Ngai (2001) who consider education credential as an important signal 
about employee level of competence.  
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Resumen en castellano 
 
        El foco de esta tesis es analizar el trabajo en equipo mirando a los miembros 
individuales del grupo la satisfacción, el comportamiento y perspectivas de carrera. Sólo 
mediante la investigación de los individuos podemos tener una idea correcta de cómo el 
equipo está funcionando siendo de hecho la suma de los esfuerzos individuales, el 
compromiso y las relaciones entre los miembros del equipo. ¿Cuáles son los planes de 
compensación preferidos por los empleados? ¿Hay algún otro tipo de recompensas no 
monetarias que contribuyan a una mayor satisfacción o al comportamiento de ayuda 
entre los miembros del grupo? Y realmente recompensa formar parte de un equipo en 
términos de incrementar la cooperación entre los miembros del grupo y promociones 
potenciales? Estas son las preguntas de investigación que tengo la intención de 
responder en mi tesis. 
        Los datos que utilizo en esta tesis vienen de la cuarta Encuesta europea sobre las 
condiciones de trabajo realizada en 2005 por la Fundación Europea para la Mejora de 
Vida y de Trabajo. Este estudio ofrece un análisis de las condiciones de trabajo en los 
27 países de la Unión Europea, en los dos países candidatos (Turquía y Croacia), en 
Suiza y Noruega. En total, casi 30.000 trabajadores individuales fueron entrevistados en 
las entrevistas cara a cara en sus propias casas entre septiembre y noviembre de 2005, 
pero analice principalmente las observaciones que se refieren a los empleados que 
trabajan en equipo. 
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         El objetivo de esta tesis es estudiar el miembro del equipo ya que es esencial para 
comprender el comportamiento individual y las expectativas a fin de entender los 
grupos de trabajo. Una vez dentro del equipo, la satisfacción individual,  la cooperación 
y las oportunidades profesionales tienen que ser cuidadosamente examinados, como a 
través de un microscopio, con el fin de analizar los factores subyacentes que los 
influyen. Abordare este tema central a través de tres ensayos, cada uno explorando un 
tema de investigación diferente y utilizando el mismo conjunto de datos descrito 
anteriormente. 
       Capítulo 1 tiene como objetivo investigar los efectos de la compensación y la 
autonomía en la satisfacción individual con goce de sueldo en el contexto del trabajo en 
equipo. Teniendo en cuenta que la literatura previa sugiere que las organizaciones con 
trabajo en equipo también deben cambiar su sistema de compensación en consecuencia, 
quiero desarrollar una perspectiva compleja que tenga en cuenta la influencia de los 
diferentes premios monetarios y no monetarios en la satisfacción con goce de sueldo. 
Partiendo de la teoría de la agencia, la teoría de la equidad y la teoría de la cooperación 
mi predicción es que tanto a destajo y las recompensas basadas en el trabajo en equipo 
están asociados con la satisfacción más alta con el pago. Por otra parte, también afirmo 
que la autonomía tanto en la forma individual como en equipo contribuye a una mayor 
satisfacción con goce de sueldo. Los resultados, utilizando la base de datos descrita 
anteriormente, confirman que tanto la compensación basada en la productividad y como 
la autonomía son herramientas importantes a la hora de determinar la satisfacción del 
empleado. Los gerentes deben saber cuándo hay que introducir recompensas basadas 
únicamente en los méritos individuales con el fin de mantener a sus trabajadores 
motivados y cuándo usar la autonomía como un amortiguador para compensar posibles 
carencias en la equidad del sistema de pago. 
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     En el capítulo 2 estoy analizando los antecedentes de la ayuda en equipos mediante 
la compensación basada en el rendimiento y la autonomía. Dado que estudios anteriores 
han examinado cada determinante sobre todo por separado, este ensayo apunta a 
desarrollar una perspectiva compleja que tenga en cuenta el efecto de las dos al mismo 
tiempo. Partiendo de la teoría de la agencia, la teoría del intercambio social y la teoría 
de la cooperación, predigo que los pagos individuales en función de la productividad 
disminuyen la cooperación, mientras que el empoderamiento, tanto a nivel individual 
como al de equipo, lleva a un comportamiento más ayuda. Este artículo mide el 
comportamiento de ayuda a través del grado de ayuda recibida por un miembro del 
equipo de otros colegas. Asumimos que los trabajadores reciban ayuda de otra persona 
que pueda ser llamada el Buen Samaritano, en dos casos: primero, cuando alguien tiene 
algo que ganar si él o ella ofrece ayuda (por ejemplo, mayor recompensa común o la 
perspectiva de recibir ayuda de otros) y en segundo lugar, cuando alguien quiere ayudar 
sólo porque él o ella puede, esta persona siendo altruista, o el Buen Samaritano. Afirmo 
que una posible explicación que va más allá de la compensación y la autonomía se 
refiere a la conducta altruista. Los resultados apoyan la mayoría de las hipótesis 
confirmando que los gerentes podrían controlar a sus empleados ya sea a través del 
sistema de compensación o a través de la autonomía para determinarlos ayudar a otros. 
Las implicaciones prácticas están también identificadas y nuevas direcciones para 
futuras investigaciones propuestas. 
       En el tercer ensayo estudio la relación entre la participación en el equipo y las 
promociones. Dado que en estudios anteriores se ha examinado sobre todo la relación 
entre la productividad y la promoción, es interesante analizar el complejo conjunto de 
variables que afectan las perspectivas de carrera más allá de este. Utilizando la teoría de 
aprendizaje de los empleados y la literatura de desarrollo profesional el objetivo de este 
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capítulo es investigar tanto los antecedentes como las consecuencias de la afiliación a 
un equipo. Sostengo que tanto el nivel de la educación y la tenencia se asocian con la 
participación del equipo, mientras que en el interior del grupo, junto con autonomía 
individuales y al nivel de equipo, conducen a altas perspectivas de promoción. Los 
resultados sugieren que los directivos prefieren seleccionar en los equipos a los 
empleados que tienen una educación alta o tienen una larga historia y experiencia en la 
organización y una vez dentro del grupo, ser parte de un equipo, tener autonomía 
individual, educación superior y gozando de autonomía a nivel de equipo -en forma de  
la libertad la elección del líder del grupo- conducen a altas perspectivas en la carrera, tal 
como se esperaba. La implicación con respecto a lograr un nivel alto de educación está 
en consonancia con las conclusiones de Arrow (1972), Spilerman y Lunde (1991) y 
Chao y Ngai (2001) quienes consideran la educación una importante señal sobre el nivel 
de competencia de los empleados. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Antecedents of Satisfaction with Pay in Teams: Do Performance-based 
Compensation and Autonomy Keep Team-members Satisfied? 
 
Introduction 
 
           The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of both performance-based 
compensation and autonomy on satisfaction with pay in the context of team working. 
Previous literature suggests that even if teams are common in organizations only some firms 
use corresponding compensation systems (Zobal, 1998; Shaw et al., 2001). Zobal (1998) 
argues that 65% of the reporting organizations had teams but only half (33%) of them had 
team compensation systems, while Shaw et al. (2001) reveals that with up to 70% of U.S. 
organizations are now using some type of team-based rewards.  
           We expect also that autonomy, as a non-monetary type of reward (Lawler, 1971) and 
satisfaction will be related in a predicable way. According to Zobal (1998), who considers 
compensation as a motivator capable to influence behaviour, if an employee is rewarded for 
certain behaviours or performance, he or she will be keener to repeat the same attitude or 
action. An employee can be motivated through either monetary or non-monetary forms of 
compensation. In the first case, employees are acknowledged their performance through an 
individual performance-pay based contract or by implementing a team-based compensation 
system that shows how the sum of individual efforts influences the whole performance of the 
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team. In the second case, autonomy, as an intangible incentive, can keep employees satisfied 
and later motivated to exert a certain effort required in their job.  
   My paper considers teams as individuals who work together for the accomplishment of a 
common goal set by a higher authority in the firm. This goal could be temporary, as in case of 
project or problem-solving teams or continuous as in the case of production teams.  An 
important contribution for the literature resides in the nature and richness of the data which 
comes from different industries and countries. 
       The aim of my paper is to develop a perspective that takes into account agency theory, 
equity theory and the theory of cooperation when analyzing the effects of performance based 
compensation and autonomy on satisfaction with pay in teams. Agency theory suggests that 
once we adopt high performance work practices we have to adapt also the compensation 
system. As well, it provides predictions on the effects of the rewards. From equity theory it 
can be inferred that the discrepancy between the deserved or expected salary and the actual 
amount received could influence satisfaction (Lawler, 1971; Crosby, 1976; Ballas, Dorling & 
Shaw, 2007) while the theory of cooperation explains the effect of the new practices on 
employee perceptions of fairness and satisfaction.  
Previous research took into consideration the roles of equity and fairness of pay systems 
(Adams, 1963: Adams & Freeman, 1976; Crosby, 1976; Frohlich, 2007; Goncalo & Kim, 
2010) and their influence on satisfaction (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987; Aquino, Griffeth, 
Allen & Hom, 1997; Masterson et al., 2000; Tremblay, Sire, & Balkin, 2000; Haar & Spell, 
2009). However, two aspects from the previous studies require a better understanding of the 
relationship between team compensation and team-member satisfaction. First, most prior 
research has studied the relationship between perceived fairness with pay and job satisfaction 
(Donovan, Drasgow & Munson, 1998; Masterson et al. 2000; Haar & Spell, 2009; 
Casuneanu, 2010) but little is known about the specific effects of different types of 
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compensation applied on team member satisfaction. Therefore, in this study I aim to 
contribute to the compensation and satisfaction literature by looking at how individual 
performance pay and team-based rewards affect employee satisfaction with pay. The goal of 
this research is to investigate both similarities and potential dissimilarities between individual 
performance pay (IPP) and team-based rewards (TBR) in order to study their main effects on 
satisfaction with pay.  
Second, a limitation of the existent research refers to the data which was used. There are few 
recent studies with non-experimental and comprehensive data. Some articles based their 
findings on experiments (i.e. Greenberg; 1988; Goncalo & Kim, 2010), other results came 
from national random samples (Tremblay, Sire & Balkin, 2000 from Canada only; Harr & 
Spell, 2009 from New Zeeland only; Casuneanu, 2010 from Romania only) or only from a 
specific industry (i.e. Gomez-Mejia & Belkin, 1989; Kirkman & Shapiro, 2000; Ramaswami 
& Singh; 2003).  Thus, in order to overcome these limitations my paper considers real data 
from across various industries and countries. The empirical analysis is based on data from the 
fourth European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) conducted in 2005 by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Having data from the 
EU (EWCS) Survey allows a more comprehensive picture on the European context in general 
and on the satisfaction of European employees in special. It offers more interesting and 
complete information than an experimental study would give due to the fact that data comes 
from real employees in different countries and it encompasses various types of job titles 
ranging from elementary to managerial occupations.  
       Previous research explored also the role of autonomy (Lawler, 1971; Greenberg, 2006; 
Haar & Spell, 2009) when it comes to employee satisfaction or other positive work-related 
attitudes (i.e. cooperation). Karasek (1979) developed a model of job demands and job 
decision latitude and observed that stress associated with high job demands decreased 
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employee satisfaction while simultaneous high job demands and high job decision latitude 
(autonomy) increased team-member satisfaction. Thus I infer that job satisfaction influenced 
by job design. Furthermore, Prendergast (2002), Raith (2008) and Ortega (2009) contended 
that there is a positive correlation between autonomy and performance-based compensation 
due to the fact that complex jobs require more discretion and compensation based on 
performance “in order to take advantage of the employee’s specific knowledge” (Ortega, 
2009). Nevertheless, previous literature was either theoretical (Predergast, 2002; Raith, 2008) 
or considered autonomy at individual level (Karasek, 1979; Ortega, 2009). There are few 
studies that take into account the influence of autonomy at team level. In order to fill this gap 
in the literature I consider in this study the role of both individual or task and team-based 
autonomy when analyzing their effects on employee satisfaction. Even if autonomy is seen as 
a non-monetary reward (Lawler, 1971) it may have a latent influence also on satisfaction with 
pay.  
 
     My research contributes to the literature by taking into account not only the type of 
compensation but also the level of autonomy that a team member enjoys when assessing team 
member satisfaction with pay as a function of perceived fairness of the rewards (Crosby, 
1976). Autonomy is expected to work like a buffer which compensates for potential injustice 
of the reward systems. Another contribution consists of analyzing simultaneously the roles of 
individual (task) and team autonomy.  
All together, this research aims to contribute to existing literature by examining different 
types of antecedents of satisfaction with pay in teams. The first type is represented by the 
form of compensation and is directly connected with the dependent variable, while the second 
type, autonomy, both individual and team-based, refers to a specific type of reward, a non-
monetary compensation which affects satisfaction with pay. 
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        The structure of the paper is presented as follows: in the next section I develop the 
theoretical framework and formulate the hypotheses of interest, in section three I describe the 
data, in the next part the results and in the last section I present the conclusions and 
implications for future research.  
Piece rates, equity and agency theory  
          In this section, the reasoning behind the selection of performance-based 
compensation as an antecedent of pay satisfaction is described as predicted by both 
equity and agency theory. To start with, according to equity theory, satisfaction with 
pay is a subjective function of both actual pay and several individual judgments, and 
thus individual performance pay has to be applied carefully by properly rewarding each 
member of the team. For instance, Crosby (1976) considered that employees may feel 
dissatisfied with their salary when there is a discrepancy between the outcome they 
want and what they receive, when they compare to somebody else who has more than 
they do (Kirkman & Shapiro, 2000), when past experience made them expect more than 
they now have, when future expectancies for achieving better outcomes are low (Cook, 
Crosby, & Hennigan, 1977), and when they feel they deserve more. Additionally, 
Lawler (1971) argued that pay satisfaction is a function of the perceived discrepancy 
between current pay and the amount of pay that should be received. Through this 
amount he referred to actual pay, wage history, and the perceived pay of referent others.  
        First, people tend to compare the amount of pay received with the expected pay. If 
team members feel they were unfairly paid, for instance they were paid less than what 
they considered based on the effort exerted, they can decide to lower their performance 
(Leventhal, 1976; Greenberg, 1988; Haar & Spell, 2009; Goncalo & Kim, 2010) or quit 
their jobs in order to end the inequity (Hom, Griffeth & Selaro, 1984; Konovsky & 
Cropanzano, 1991; Fields, Pang & Chiu, 2000).  
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      Second, workers may also feel inequity if they receive a lower compensation than 
their colleagues (Crosby, 1976; Kirkman & Shapiro, 2000). If a team member thinks 
that he or she exercised a certain level of effort that requires in change a specific amount 
of compensation he or she will expect it (Mueller, Iverson & Jo, 1999). The same idea 
that satisfaction with pay can come out from comparing one’s compensation to 
another’s is found in Ballas, Dorling and Shaw’s research (2007).  It was also suggested 
that distributive justice was obtained when individuals compared their inputs and 
outputs with those of another colleague and made fairness appraisals (Adams & 
Freeman, 1976). Likewise,  Haar and Spell (2009) argued that equity is obtained when 
“the input/outcome ratio of the individual is equal to those of others compared 
with”(p.1829) and thus employees may decide to either lower or increase their amount 
of effort or change their perceptions about these two variables (Haar & Spell, 2009). 
Consequently, and in line with previous research, I consider satisfaction with pay to 
include perceived fairness of the rewards.  
To sum up, team member satisfaction with pay depends on how fairly employees 
consider they have been compensated. Distributive justice, defined as worker’s 
evaluation of the “fairness of his or her rewards given his or her inputs”(Mueller, 
Iverson & Jo, 1999, p.871) is connected to equity theory (Adams, 1965; Haar & Spell, 
2009) and in a compensation setting it refers to the reaction of the individuals to both 
the amount and the form of compensation received (Tremblay, Sire & Balkin, 2000; 
Haar & Spell, 2009). According to equity theory, the greater the discrepancy between 
the amount employees believe they should receive and the actual amount they receive, 
the greater is their tension or dissatisfaction (Lawler 1990; Livingstone, Roberts, and 
Chonko 1995).Specifically, the prediction of this theory is that employees prefer 
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individual performance compensation as long as it is properly applied with respect to 
their expectations and compared to other team members.  
      However, if the manager does not observe this effort he would not compensate it 
accordingly (Holmstrom, 1982). And so, due to moral hazard, employees could feel 
dissatisfied and perform at a lower level leaving the managers with the free riding 
problem. In a team setting, the application of individual performance compensation 
could negatively affect employees who may not perceive their goals as cooperatively 
linked and may tend to see their jobs and personal tasks as separated from those of their 
colleagues.  
      With respect to direct effects on satisfaction, scholars considered that distributive 
justice, as part of organizational justice, predicts job satisfaction (Greenberg, 1990b; 
McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Martin & Bennett, 1996). Furthermore, literature 
connected also justice perceptions with respect to pay to job satisfaction (Moorman, 
1991; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Aquino, Griffeth, Allen & Hom, 1997; Donovan, 
Drasgow & Munson, 1998; Masterson et al. 2000; Colquitt et al., 2001; Haar & Spell, 
2009). So it is crucial to apply a fair compensation system trying to avoid moral hazard 
and subjective interpretations in order to keep the workers satisfied with their salary. It 
is only when individual performance based compensation are applied fairly or perceived 
to be following distributive justice rules that employees will present a high pay 
satisfaction.  
       Another interesting fact revealed by the literature on piece rates is that high-ability 
workers could form a team norm that must be also achieved by the lowest-ability 
employees (Hamilton et al., 2003) or the rest of the team members who may feel 
pressure to reach a certain productivity level in order to receive a satisfactory salary.  In 
keeping with previous research, due to complying with specific productivity levels and 
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considering no moral hazard problems, I expect individual performance pay to increase 
employee satisfaction with pay. Consequently, in a team setting, if employees are 
properly rewarded individually they will feel more satisfied with pay since in a group it 
is easier to see and compare efforts and outcomes. Therefore, the prediction of agency 
theory, as well as the expectation of equity theory, suggests that compensation based on 
individual productivity leads to increased pay satisfaction:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The adoption of individual performance-based compensation leads to 
higher employee satisfaction with pay in teams. 
 
Team-based rewards and cooperation 
   Among the many rules that people use to allocate goods and resources (Deutsch, 
1985), two have received more emphasis along the time: the equity rule, described in 
the previous section, in which people are rewarded in direct proportion to their 
individual contribution (Adams, 1963; 1965), and the equality rule, in which all team 
members receive the same amount regardless of their individual contribution (Deutsch, 
1975). How distributive justice refers to the distribution of socially-valued goods and 
resources (Foa & Foa, 1974) and to the perceived fairness of the outcomes received 
(Frohlich, 2007; Goncalo & Kim, 2010) this paper takes it into consideration when 
analyzing the effect of salary type on satisfaction with pay.  
      Previous research presents contradictory findings regarding the relationship between 
team based rewards (TBR) and pay satisfaction: while it was argued that TBR could 
increase pay satisfaction, it was also believed that they may reduce pay satisfaction. In 
this section, the reasoning behind each view is described as predicted by the theory of 
cooperation and equity/equality theory. To begin with, following the assumptions from 
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theory of cooperation, employees working in a group would generally see their goals as 
cooperatively linked (Deutsch, 1949; De Dreu, 2007) and so they may prefer a 
compensation based on team performance knowing that their actions are also for the 
greater good of the team as a whole. Team-member satisfaction depends on the 
perception of its members who may consider that being rewarded collectively would 
ultimately be beneficial for their own interests. Thus, I expect that employees working 
in a group would generally see their goals as cooperatively linked and be more satisfied 
when they receive a group-based reward. 
     From an equity/equality perspective, Folger and Cropanzano (1998) noted that 
“justice holds people together whereas injustice can pull them apart”. Moreover and in 
line with theory of cooperation, Kirkman and Shapiro (2000) found that employees 
were more receptive to TBRs when they perceived they were treated fairly. Also 
perceptions of fairness are likely to promote feelings of job satisfaction because of the 
attainment of expected rewards (Sridhar N. Ramaswami & Jagdip Singh; 2003).  
Consequently, an equality rule (i.e. team-based compensation) facilitates team members 
to perceive their tasks as cooperatively linked and thus increase their motivation to work 
harder for a higher group reward. These arguments predict a positive relationship 
between group rewards and pay satisfaction because in a team setting people tend to 
perceive their goals as related from the beginning (through team cohesiveness). 
Furthermore, if there is distributive justice and moral hazard is low, team based rewards 
lead to more pay satisfaction as employees acknowledge that they work together for the 
accomplishment of a common goal which will later reflect in a common reward. 
     Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between performance-based 
compensation and satisfaction found that individual-based rewards contributed to less 
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pay satisfaction than aggregate compensation (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1989; Lee, 
1996; Garza, 1998), thus confirming the theoretical predictions.  
     However, there is another standpoint in the literature which considers that team pay 
can lead to perceptions of inequalities about the payment received among the workers, 
and so it can hamper satisfaction. It was found that organizations that rate as successful 
did not eliminate individual rewards in favor of team rewards (Zobal, 1999). 
Nevertheless, previous research presents more and stronger arguments for the positive 
relationship between group based rewards and pay satisfaction. From the premises of 
the theory of cooperation and consistent with Kirkman and Shapiro (2000) finding that 
employees are more receptive to TBRs when they perceive justice and a fit between 
group based rewards and organizational changes, I expect that in the case of TBR 
employees would see their goals as cooperatively linked and thus be more satisfied:  
 
 Hypothesis 2: The adoption of team-based rewards increases individual satisfaction    
 with pay in teams. 
 
The role of Autonomy   
         Previous research explored the connection between employee discretion and 
performance based pay. Prendergast (2002), Raith (2008) and Ortega (2009) found a 
positive correlation between them due to the fact that complex jobs require more 
discretion and compensation based on performance “in order to take advantage of the 
employee’s specific knowledge” (Ortega, 2009). Furthermore, Barth, Bratsberg, 
Haegeland and Raaum (2008) assert that performance-related pay is prevalent in firms 
where workers have a higher degree of autonomy in how they organize their work. In 
line with these findings it was also asserted that when managers encourage employees 
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to trust their own decisions and judgement there would be a certain level of satisfaction 
regardless of how compensation is distributed (Haar & Spell, 2009). Consequently, 
autonomy could provide a very good insight in understanding employee satisfaction 
with pay as a part of overall satisfaction. According to equity theory, employees who 
were reassigned to higher status offices raised their performance as a response to 
overpayment inequity and those reassigned to lower status offices decreased their 
performance as a response to underpayment inequity Greenberg (1988). Moorman 
(1991) stated that “if employees believe they are treated fairly, they will be more likely 
to hold positive attitudes about their work and their work outcomes”(p.845). Therefore, 
it is important to know which variables influence individual satisfaction beyond the 
distribution system in order to balance its potential negative effects. Previous literature 
considered the potential mitigating role of non-monetary rewards which could 
compensate for low distributive justice like job autonomy (Lawler, 1971; Campion & 
Berger, 1990).  It is considered that if employees have more autonomy, they obtain 
more non-pecuniary rewards, and therefore, controlling for pay level, autonomy should 
have a positive effect on pay satisfaction. Moreover, Nguyen, Taylor and Bradley 
(2003) found that perceived job autonomy influences positively satisfaction with pay. 
         In keeping with previous literature, my research proposes to explore the role of 
both individual and team autonomy which may directly affect satisfaction with pay. 
There are several other arguments for using individual autonomy as an antecedent for 
satisfaction with pay. First, autonomy can be regarded as a non-monetary reward 
(Lawler, 1971) and so can be positively linked to satisfaction as it has similar 
characteristics with pay.     Second, past research considered satisfaction with pay as an 
important component of job satisfaction (Harr and Speel, 2009) which was found to be 
increasing with autonomy (Boffey, 1985) or worker’s control over how a job is done 
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(Nguyen, Taylor & Bradley, 2003). Empirical evidence presents mixed results when it 
comes to the relationship between individual autonomy and job satisfaction. Sprigg, 
Jackson and Parker (2000) found no main effects for individual autonomy. However, a 
great amount of literature found individual autonomy positively related to job 
satisfaction (Hartline and Ferrell, 1996; Hartline et al., 2000; Hui, Au & Fock, 2004; 
Haar and Spell, 2009). Thus, indirectly, autonomy and pay satisfaction seem to be 
connected. 
      Additional support suggesting potential effects of autonomy was found in the model 
of job demands, job decision latitude and mental strain developed by Karasek (1979). 
He found that stressful jobs decreased satisfaction of team members unless correlated 
with high autonomy. Consequently, in the context of high autonomy team members 
would feel satisfied as managers trust their judgement and their abilities (Haar & Spell, 
2009) and perceive autonomy as a specific type of reward (Campion & Berger, 1990) 
that could compensate for potential low level of distributive justice. On the other hand, 
in the case of low autonomy, since employees have less control over their work they 
would be focused more on how rewards are distributed (Haar & Spell, 2009) and thus, 
the relationship between performance-based compensation and pay satisfaction will be 
strictly determined by how management is applying compensation. For example, in a 
team context, using an individual performance pay system considered inappropriate due 
to moral hazard or personal judgements and without giving enough employee discretion 
could decrease individual satisfaction with pay.  
       Thus, taking into account the predictions from previous literature which regard 
autonomy as a determinant of job satisfaction and pay satisfaction as a component of 
employee satisfaction, I expect individual autonomy to influence positively satisfaction 
with pay: 
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Hypothesis 3: Individual autonomy increases satisfaction with pay in teams 
 
       Team autonomy can be considered a determinant of pay satisfaction as well. At team 
level, individual autonomy is insufficient if it is not complemented with team autonomy. 
Previous research argued that autonomy has to be “truly collective, distributed throughout 
the team so that each team-member must have both autonomy to act and the ability to 
influence others to act” (Spriggs, Jackson & Parker, 2000). Moreover, it was argued that 
team autonomy parallels individual autonomy (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990; Kirkman & 
Rosen, 1999). 
       There is also empirical evidence that group autonomy has a positive effect on job 
satisfaction in general, and pay satisfaction in particular. Scholars found that group 
autonomy was positively related to job satisfaction which included satisfaction with pay 
(Kirkman & Rosen, 1999; Spriggs, Jackson & Parker, 2000). Since team autonomy has 
been considered the team-level analogy of individual autonomy (Van Mierlo et al., 2006) 
I hypothesize:  
 
  Hypothesis 4: Team-based autonomy increases satisfaction with pay in teams 
 
 
 
Model: 
     Satisfaction with pay in a team can be determined directly by the compensation type 
and inferred through the degree of autonomy- both individual and team-based- inside a 
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team. Consequently, as shown in Figure 1, in a team context, I predict that all variables 
have a positive effect on employee satisfaction with pay. 
 
Figure 1:  
 
 
 
 
Method 
    The data that I use in this paper comes from the fourth European Working Conditions 
Survey conducted in 2005 by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions. This survey provides an analysis of working conditions in the 27 
countries of the European Union, in the two candidate countries (Turkey and Croatia), in 
Switzerland and Norway. 
      In total, nearly 30.000 individual workers were interviewed in face-to-face interviews in 
their own homes between September and November of 2005, but I restricted the sample to 
employees who report working in a team. The unit of analysis is the individual and the 
observations are cross-national. The survey sampled the total active population of the 
respective nationalities of the EU member states, aged 15 years and over, resident in the 
countries involved in the survey.  
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Dependent variable 
      As Crosby (1976) noted that satisfaction with pay is a function of both actual pay and 
several judgments that employees make such as comparisons to others, personal desires and 
expectations, satisfaction with pay is considered to include perceived fairness of the rewards. 
Therefore, satisfaction with pay was assessed using a single-item scale based on question 
q37b from the EWC Survey:  “I am well paid for the work I do”, coded 1= strongly disagree 
and 5= strongly agree. Respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale how strongly 
they agreed or disagreed with the affirmation from above.  This measure was assessed based 
on the scale developed by Warr et al (1979) which includes both intrinsic and extrinsic 
aspects of job satisfaction, such as pay. Considering pay a dimension of job satisfaction is 
also in line with Sprigg et al. (2000) and Green and Heywood (2008). 
 
Independent and moderator variables 
Individual performance pay was measured through a dummy variable based on question 
ef6b from EWC Survey: “What does your remuneration include: Piece rate or 
productivity payments?”, coded 0= not mentioned, 1= mentioned.  
Team based rewards variable was measured also through a dummy variable based on 
question ef6h from the same Survey: “What does your remuneration include: Payments 
based on the overall performance of a group?”, coded 0= not mentioned, 1= mentioned. 
Individual Autonomy was measured through an index variable which represents the mean 
of three dummy variables: weather or not the employee can decide on his or her methods 
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of work, the order of tasks and the speed of work. It uses variable q24a,b,c from the 
survey. 
Team autonomy was measured through a dummy variables based on question q26b_1a from 
the survey: “Do the members of the team decide by themselves on the division of tasks? “ 
with levels 1 for those who answered “Yes” meaning high team autonomy, and 0 otherwise.  
  
Control variables 
Three sets of control variables were used to account for potential individual, 
organizational level effects and contextual effects. Thus, the variables I use are: age of the 
respondent (continuous variable), gender of the respondent (dummy variable with value 0 
for women and 1 for men), occupation title (categorical variable ranging form 1= 
elementary occupations to 10= managerial jobs), organizational size (categorical variable 
with 8 levels according to the number of employees), country (where the survey was 
conducted) and industry (in which the respondent activates).  
Employees’ attitude can also depend on the complexity of tasks that they have to develop 
and on their specific knowledge and abilities. Literature on specific knowledge 
(Prendergast 2002; Raith, 2008; Ortega, 2009) argues that employees with more complex 
jobs have more specific knowledge. As it is too costly for the firm to know which actions 
are optimal, it is preferred to use a performance pay scheme and let the agent decide 
which action to take. Therefore, in this research I control for occupation level that ranges 
from elementary occupations to managerial jobs.  
In order to test the hypotheses I estimate the following general employee satisfaction with 
pay (SWP) equation: 
 SWP = F (IPP, TBR, Individual Autonomy, Team Autonomy, Individual, 
Organizational, Contextual Characteristics) 
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Results 
  
         I started to analyze the data by observing the descriptive statistics among the main 
variables of interest: piece rates, team-based rewards, individual and team-level autonomy, 
age, gender, tenure and satisfaction with pay. Then, I report a table with the correlations 
among the variables and finally test the hypotheses using OLS regression analyses with two 
models: first, the basic model considers only the effect of control variables while the second 
model presents direct effects of the independent variables.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  N Mean SD Min Max 
1. Piece rates or productivity payments 13193 0.12 0.33 0 1 
2. Team-based rewards 13142 0.06 0.24 0 1 
3. Individual autonomy 14752 2.03 1.13 0 3 
4. Team autonomy 14590 0.54 0.50 0 1 
5. Age 14741 40.33 11.60 15 99 
6. Gender 14770 0.51 0.50 0 1 
7. Tenure 14602 9.85 9.79 0 60 
8. Satisfaction with pay for team members 14682 2.99 1.20 1 5 
9. Satisfaction with pay for other workers 9833 2.98 1.19 1 5 
10. Satisfaction with pay for all employees 24813 2.98 1.20 1 5 
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables of my research. Piece rates 
(PR), team-based rewards (TBR), individual autonomy and team autonomy are the 
independent variables that influence employee satisfaction with pay in teams, while age, 
gender and tenure are control variables describing the individuals. What is interesting to 
observe is that respondents are generally satisfied with their pay (2.98) and PR and TBR are 
not very common as their means are around 0. Also, I see that the average individual 
autonomy is 1.13 representing about one third of the total potential. Team autonomy is more 
balanced as its mean is 0.54 and tenure in a company is around 10 years (9.85). 
Table 2 presents the correlations between the main variables of my research. I notice a 
negative and significant correlation between PR and individual autonomy (-0.07), between 
PR and autonomy at team level (-0.05), between PR and age (-0.04), between PR and tenure        
(-0.04).  There is also a negative correlation between team autonomy and gender (-0.07). 
Positive and significant correlations are found between PR and gender (0.08), between TBR 
and gender (0.05), between individual autonomy and age (0.03), between individual 
autonomy and tenure (0.04) and between team autonomy and satisfaction with pay (0.08). 
The highest correlations are between individual and team autonomy (0.21) and between age 
and tenure (0.57).   
Table 2: Correlations among the main variables 
Variable  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Piece rates or productivity payments       
2. Team-based rewards 0.11       
3. Individual autonomy -0.07•  0.03      
4. Team autonomy -0.05• -0.01   0.21•     
5. Age -0.04• -0.01   0.03• 0.01    
6. Gender  0.08•    0.05•  0.01 -0.07• -0.01   
7. Tenure -0.04•  0.02   0.04•   -0.01    0.57• 0.03  
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8. Satisfaction with pay -0.01  0.03   0.12•   0.08•  -0.01  0.11•   0.01 
Significant correlations using Spearman test are market with • and correspond to p<.01 
 Table 3:  Regression analysis for performance-based compensation and autonomy 
predicting satisfaction with pay in teams 
Variables        Direct Effects 
Piece rates or productivity payments  .1030•• 
Team-based rewards               .0102 
Individual autonomy    .0451••• 
Team Autonomy    .1400••• 
Individual 
Age 
Gender 
Tenure 
Job title dummies 
Salary dummies 
-.0031•• 
.0208 
           -.0007 
Yes 
Yes 
Organizational Size dummies Yes 
Contextual  
Industry dummies 
Country dummies 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Number of observations  
 
 
6315 
 R2  0.1893 
Adjusted R2  0.1799 
Root MSE  1.0901 
Notes:  The Satisfaction equation is estimated by OLS 
• p<.1 
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•• p<.05     
••• p<.01 
Table 3 presents the results of steps that I followed for testing the hypotheses. The 
satisfaction equation is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares2. In Step 1 I consider only 
the effects of the control variables on satisfaction with pay in teams, while Step 2 adds the 
effects of the independent variables: PR, TBR, individual and team-based autonomy.  
The first conclusion is that PR influence positively satisfaction with pay, its coefficient being  
-.103 (p<.05). This finding supports the first hypothesis, confirming that the adoption of 
piece rates or other productivity payments leads to higher employee satisfaction with pay in 
teams. However, I found little support for the second hypothesis as TBR were not found 
significant. Contrary to the expectations, this result does not support Hypothesis 2.  
Remember that Hypotheses 3 asserts that individual autonomy affects positively the team-
member satisfaction. Results from Table 3 confirm this hypothesis as the coefficient of 
individual autonomy is positive and significant: .0451 (p<.01).  
As for the autonomy at team level I notice that its effect is also positive and significant .14 
(p<.01) supporting Hypothesis 4. 
          Consequently, piece rates (or other productivity payments), both individual and team-
based autonomy are essential in order to keep team-members satisfied with their pay. While 
compensation type is a more evident determinant of satisfaction it is interesting to observe 
how autonomy still has an important effect even after I controlled for salary dummies for 
each category. As expected salary categories are significant but not sufficient: 
 
 
 
                                                             
2 This satisfaction equation is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares but the same results in terms of 
significance were obtained through estimating a similar equation with Ordered Logit. 
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Table 4: Salary categories and significance 
Salary category   
      
Coefficient     P-value 
 Salary 2    -.0867 0.218 
 Salary 3    -.0144 0.832 
 Salary 4 .1754••• 0.008 
 Salary 5 .1675••• 0.009 
 Salary 6 .3323••• 0.000 
 Salary 7 .4046••• 0.000 
 Salary 8 .5019••• 0.000 
 Salary 9 .7154••• 0.000  
 Salary 10 .9649••• 0.000  
 
 
Table 4 presents the significance of each salary category compared to the lowest salary 
level, salary 1. In the regression I find that all salary dummies from salary 4 to salary 10, 
representing medium-high salary bands, have a positive and significant effect on 
satisfaction with pay. Thus, I observe that compensation magnitude is an important tool 
when it comes to employee satisfaction but it has to be applied carefully and along with 
the proper compensation type and amount of autonomy. This happens because the form or 
type of compensation, especially piece rates or other productivity payments are closer to 
the employee perception of fair pay as it is easier to measure one´ s work. Therefore, if 
employees may feel less satisfied with their salary band they could come to a better 
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understanding of the situation by considering their direct and quantifiable effort. 
Moreover, when managers offer employees discretion, they may regard it as a non-
monetary type of rewards and consequently one can balance a low-medium salary level 
with freedom of choice regarding methods of work, division of tasks or spare time.  
          In order to check if our results are robust to a more general structure of errors, I ran 
tests with robust standard errors clustering after countries. I expect that people from the same 
country to be correlated and results show that in this case both types of autonomy, individual 
and team-based are significant and positive (p<.01). 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
     The purpose of this study is to analyze the antecedents of satisfaction with pay in teams 
by focusing on performance pay and autonomy. In order to study the hypotheses of interest I 
considered both piece rates/productivity payments and team-based rewards and also two 
types of autonomy: individual and team-based. Data comes from the forth EWCS and I 
employed Ordinary Least Squares analysis.       
      Several important findings emerge from this study. First, my results show that piece rates 
or other productivity payments are associated with higher pay satisfaction, offering support 
to Hypothesis 1, while team-based rewards do not influence satisfaction with pay, meaning 
that hypothesis 2 was not supported. These findings are in line with previous research which 
considered that employees who experience distributive fairness are likely to indicate greater 
satisfaction (Moorman 1991; Netemeyer et al. 1997). Haar and Spell (2009) contended that 
“understanding the links between organizational justice and the distribution of employee 
reward system is vital for motivating employees” (p.1830).  
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      Second, with respect to autonomy the results show that both individual and team-based 
discretion are positively associated with pay satisfaction, as predicted by hypotheses 3 and 4.  
The coefficient of team autonomy (0.14) is the highest coefficient of all the significant 
variables suggesting that team autonomy is an important tool for keeping employees 
satisfied. It looks like irrespective of the amount or type of compensation employees with 
high autonomy (individual or group-based) consider themselves more satisfied or “fairly” 
paid for what they do. Thus, if the rewards system lacks justice due to moral hazard 
(Holmstrom, 1982) or other subjective factors at least autonomy can compensate for it and 
keep team-members satisfied with what they receive according to the job done. We have to 
remember the specificity of this study which uses as dependent variable the answer to the 
question “I am well paid for what I do”. This comprises two parts: the direct or evident which 
refers to the fairness of the rewards and the less obvious one which considers other non-
monetary benefits.  
 
Implications, limitations and future research 
 
    This study presents some limitations that have to be looked at carefully. First, this research 
is a cross-sectional analysis; there is only one period of time, between September and 
November of 2005. It would be interesting to study if the findings change when we conduct a 
time series analysis. 
   The second limitation of this study is due to data availability: the survey does not offer 
precise information about piece rates or productivity payments so one can infer that are either 
individual or group-based. However, the survey has another specific question, ef6h, which 
refers only to compensation based on group performance so one can assume that the question 
about piece rates and other productivity payments (ef6b) refers to individual based rewards.  
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But this is not clearly stated in the survey. For future research it would be interesting to see 
the exact percent that corresponds to group compensation and to compare it with the percent 
for individual performance pay.   
   Finally, the contribution of this study demonstrates that both individual and team-based 
autonomy influence positively pay satisfaction and perceived fairness in teams. Moreover, it 
looks like team autonomy has a bigger effect on our research variable, with a coefficient of 
0.140 compared to 0.045 of individual or task autonomy. 
   Taken together, my results imply that both productivity based rewards and autonomy are 
important tools when it comes to determining employee satisfaction. Managers should know 
when to introduce rewards based only on individual merits so as to keep their workers 
motivated and when to give employees autonomy in order to compensate for potential 
fairness shortcomings in the payment system.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
 
The Determinants of Helping Behavior in Teams 
 
  Introduction 
        The goal of this paper is to analyze the antecedents of helping behaviour in teams by 
looking at performance based compensation and autonomy. We build upon previous 
organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB) literature by focusing on a specific area, helping 
behaviour received in teams. This paper considers teams as groups of people who work 
together for the accomplishment of a common goal set by a higher authority in the firm. This 
goal could be temporary, as in case of project or problem-solving teams or continuous as in 
the case of production teams. It is important to relate helping behavior and compensation in 
order to study which payment schemes are prone to induce more or less help in a team 
context. Also, autonomy is connected to the amount of assistance received as it enables 
workers to move across and answer requests of help from their colleagues. Managers should 
know when to apply a specific form of compensation and when to use a specific job design 
with the purpose of creating a good and efficient working environment in which employees 
receive help when they ask for it.  
         Human resources management is one of the critical areas in which changes and 
adoption of new rules and procedures have been evident in the last decades. Most of these 
practices refer to the adoption of alternative forms of team-based organization together with 
learning, decentralization of decision making rights and incentives, all in order to enhance 
employee’s involvement and knowledge sharing. Moreover, compensation is also of growing 
importance because firms need to both adjust their payment schemes according to their 
organizational design and understand as well that compensation influences behavior and can 
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consequently be used as a motivator. If an employee is rewarded for certain behaviours or 
performance, he or she will be keener to repeat the same attitude or action (Zobal, 1998). So, 
we motivate an employee by showing that his performance is taken into account through an 
individual performance-pay type of contract or by implementing a team-based pay that shows 
how the individual effort influences the whole performance of the team.   
       Another aspect concerning teams refers to their general purpose. Thus, it is considered 
that teams are implemented so that their members can combine and apply their differences in 
skills and abilities through helping each other, and providing each other with advice 
(Tjosvold and Yu, 2004; Oosterhof, Van der Vegt, Van de Vliert and Sanders, 2009). For that 
reason helping behavior is important not only for employees, as it provides and maintains a 
good and friendly environment, but also for the organization, as it increases productivity. For 
instance, Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) found that heterogeneous teams formed by 
both high and low-ability workers were more efficient than homogeneous teams in terms of 
ability. In this study I assume that workers receive help from somebody else who may be 
called the good Samaritan in two cases: first, when somebody else has something to gain if he 
or she offers help (for instance higher common reward or the perspective of receiving help 
himself) and second, when somebody else wants to help only because he or she can-has the 
necessary autonomy to do it, this person being the good Samaritan3. 
In this way, my paper contributes to the literature by considering the concept of Good 
Samaritan behavior as a potential explanation for OCB irrespective of the compensation 
system (Tang et al., 2008) and by introducing the role of autonomy at both individual and 
team level.  
                                                             
3
 The concept of the “Good Samaritan” comes from the Biblical parable with the same name and refers to 
those who come to the aid of others for no other reason than kindness, therefore acting without any 
expectation of reward (Brouhard, 2007). The Good Samaritan’s helping motives are purely intrinsic and 
altruistic in nature and lead to genuine helping behavior (Tang, Sutarso, Wu Davis, Dolinski, Ibrahim and 
Wagner, 2008) 
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       The goal of my study is to develop a perspective that takes into account these 
assumptions when analyzing the effect of performance pay compensation and autonomy on 
helping behaviour in teams. If previous research on OCB focused on the relationship between 
satisfaction and cooperation (Organ, 1990; Organ & Ryan, 1995), I want to explore which 
factors of those that lead to satisfaction and analyzed in the first essay lead also to increased 
helping behavior. Theories relevant to my research question are agency theory from 
economics, and both social exchange theory and the theory of cooperation from psychology. 
First, agency theory suggests that once we adopt high performance work practices4 we have 
to adapt also the compensation system. Moreover, it provides predictions on the effects of the 
rewards. The connection between employee autonomy and performance pay was explored by 
Prendergast (2002), Raith (2008) and Ortega (2009) who found a positive correlation 
between them as complex jobs require more discretion and compensation based on 
performance “in order to take advantage of the employee’s specific knowledge” (Ortega, 
2009). Following agency theory premises, it is expected to introduce also autonomy as a 
determinant of helping behavior as it is highly correlated with the compensation system and 
also considered a type of non-monetary reward (Lawler, 1971; Campion & Berger, 1990). 
Second, I draw from social-exchange theory in order to investigate why team-members help 
their colleagues. Based on the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), a significant source of 
helping behavior refers to how much organizational citizenship behavior an employee has 
previously received from coworkers (Deckop, Cirka & Andersson, 2003). Third, the theory 
of cooperation explains the effect of the new practices on employee behavior which may 
explain the determinants of assistance received through pure altruistic behaviors as team-
members perceive easier their goals as connected and the similarities among themselves. 
                                                             
4 High performance work systems are a systemic approach to organizational design that seeks to align the 
organization and its environment, the organizational structure, systems, and processes using team 
structures in order to achieve operational effectiveness, innovation, and high quality results for customers 
(Sienknecht and Aken, 1999). 
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Therefore, the motivation of this paper is to investigate how performance based 
compensation and autonomy shape helping behaviour among team-members and to analyze 
how much help comes from “the love of money” (Tang, Sutarso, Wu Davis, Dolinski, 
Ibrahim & Wagner, 2008) and how much from good Samaritan attitudes. 
       Unfortunately, research examining the relationship between piece rates and helping 
behaviour has offered contradictory responses. While it has been argued that team-based 
performance pay increase cooperative behaviour (Miller and Hamblin; 1963, Rosenbaum et 
al., 1980; Shea and Guzzo, 1989; Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer, 2007; Bamberger and Levi, 
2009), it has also been found that task and not reward interdependence drives helping 
behaviour (Wageman and Baker, 1999). Therefore, in order to come to terms with the 
conflicting results from the literature, in this article I argue that two aspects of the previous 
studies require a better understanding of the relationship between team compensation and 
team-member behaviour. First, as noted before, most prior research has studied the 
relationship between the compensation system and cooperation in groups but very little is 
known about the role played by autonomy in this context. Consequently, in this study I aim to 
contribute to the compensation and behavioural literature by looking at how both individual 
and team-level autonomy affect the amount of assistance received in teams.  Second, a 
limitation of the existent research refers to the data which was used. There are very few 
studies with non-experimental data. Many articles based their findings on experiments or 
quasi-experimental field studies (Wageman, 1995; Wageman and Baker, 1999; Bamberger 
and Levi, 2009). Other results came from national random samples that were not recent 
enough and described only a particular field (e.g. Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer, 2007 who 
used a 1978 survey from the medical field). Thus, in order to overcome these limitations my 
paper considers real and recent data from across various industries and countries. The 
empirical analysis is based on data from the fourth European Working Conditions Survey 
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conducted in 2005 by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions. Third, a direction of future research in Chen and Chiu (2009) paper refers to 
exploring simultaneously the direct and indirect effects of autonomy on OCB. Consequently, 
the goal of my research is to analyze in the same paper the influence of autonomy on help 
received in teams both as independent and moderator variable.  
        The structure of the paper is presented as follows: in the next section I develop the 
theoretical framework and formulate the hypotheses of interest, in section three I describe the 
data, then I present the results and in the last section I discuss the conclusions and 
implications for future research.  
 
Previous Literature concerning Helping Behavior in Teams 
         The evidence comes mainly from agency theory, social-exchange theory and the theory 
of cooperation. Agency theory suggests that once high performance work practices are 
adopted there is a necessity to adapt also the compensation system, while the theory of 
cooperation explains the effect of the new practices on employee behavior.  
        
The Influence of Agency Theory  
      When I analyze the agency theory perspective I focus on performance pay compensation 
and its influence on helping behavior in teams. In this context I draw from agency theory the 
idea that individuals respond to financial incentives and will therefore help one another if this 
leads to an increase in pay or if offering help does not have a detrimental effect on their own 
work pace and time allocated for finishing their own jobs. Then, it is interesting to analyze 
which compensation scheme is best in order to induce helping behavior. In a team context, 
receiving piece rates or other productivity payments may diminish the probability of giving 
assistance to other colleagues due to the fact that employees are paid according to their 
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individual work, which in this case is easily measurable. Consequently, each minute that an 
employee spends helping another may have an opportunity cost.  
 
         Empirical Evidence    
     Financial incentives are considered to be the most powerful of all compensation types in 
aligning organizational objectives and employee behavior. When we apply performance pay 
rewards we have to do it very carefully by rewarding properly each member of the team. If 
any member feels that he or she was paid less than what he or she considered according to 
the effort supplied, we face the problem of observation and the employee can decide to lower 
his or her performance. Employees may feel injustice if they receive a lower compensation 
than their colleagues (Kirkman and Shapiro, 2000). If the worker from a team thinks that he 
or she exercised a certain level of effort that requires in exchange a certain amount of 
compensation he or she will expect it. But, if the manager does not observe this effort he will 
not compensate it accordingly. And here appears the observation problem which can 
determine the employee to withdraw from the team or to perform at a lower level (free riding 
problem). Moreover, an employee can decide not to respond to a request of assistance 
received from another colleague if he or she feels that the compensation received did not 
match his or her effort.  
      With respect to the relationship between the compensation received and cooperation, it 
was argued that worker decisions to help one another are influenced negatively by 
promotion-based incentives (Drago and Garvey, 1998). On the other hand, previous literature 
has found that group rewards lead to increased cooperative behavior (Miller and Hamblin, 
1963; Shea and Guzzo, 1989; Bamberger and Levi, 2009) and that performance-based 
compensation (at both individual and group level) influences positively employees´ 
perceived rewards for sharing knowledge (Siemsen, Balasubramanian & Roth, 2007). The 
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relationship between incentive pay and intra-group consultations is also consistent with 
mutual help activities (Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer, 2007). The authors found that “high-
powered individual incentives will cause individuals to shirk on help to others” as “in a 
group of four physicians, increasing incentives from equal sharing (team-based rewards) to 
full incentive pay reduces the frequency of intra-group consultations by 0.19 per day” 
(Encinosa, Gaynor & Rebitzer, 2007). 
        Additionally, in order to be able to move and answer to assistance requests employees 
need autonomy. Workers need flexibility to move and help their team-mates. If they do not 
answer to their colleagues’ requests for help that does not mean that they are not eager to 
assist, it may be due to the job title specificity which does not allow to leave the job or to 
interrupt what one doing at a specific moment. On the other hand, an employee who enjoys 
autonomy can decide by himself or herself what do to in his or her own time. Moreover, 
discretion is beneficial as employees can make use of their specific knowledge (Ortega, 
2009).  
    
     The Psychological Perspective 
     Once team-working and innovative compensation schemes have been introduced within 
companies we need to explore their effect on employee behaviour. The psychological 
perspective comprises both social-exchange theory with roots in economics, psychology and 
sociology and the theory of cooperation.  
      
       Social-Exchange theory 
      In order to be able to help one another, employees have to be endowed with autonomy or 
to receive some kind of reward based on group performance. This paper considers autonomy 
at both individual and team-level. Even if most prior research following Karasek (1979) has 
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conceptualized autonomy at individual level of analysis it is also advisable to look at multiple 
levels (e.g. Seibert, Silver and Randolph, 2004) as they can offer a more accurate perspective 
on the role of empowerment. Furthermore, previous research argued that autonomy will be 
insufficient “unless it is truly collective, distributed throughout the team so that each team-
member must have both autonomy to act and the ability to influence others to act” (Spriggs, 
Jackson & Parker, 2000). However, sometimes team-autonomy may inhibit individual 
autonomy as decisions are shared rather than taken alone and responsibility is diffused instead 
of granted to one person (Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1998; Kirkman & Rosen, 1999) so it is 
advisable to consider the potential moderating role of this construct. According to social-
exchange theory co-worker support can be explained through the concept of “team-member 
exchange” (TMX, Seers et al., 1995; Cole et al. 2002; Van Mierlo et al., 2006) which captures 
the willingness of an employee to help the team or other team-members to accomplish their 
goals. According to Van Mierlo et al. (2006), an employee may thus reciprocate supportive 
actions from colleagues by engaging in extra role behaviours. Reciprocation has been found 
in disciplines ranging from economics (Rappaport and Chammah, 1965) to evolutionary 
biology (Axelrod, 1984) as an optimal strategy for long-term self-benefit (Deckop, Cirka & 
Andersson, 2003).  Thus, building on Gouldner`s (1960) norm of reciprocity it is likely that 
an employee who previously received help from another to be keen to return the favour. 
Deckop, Cirka and Andersson (2003) actually found that employees help their colleagues 
because they received help from others.        
        To sum up, in the case of a compensation based on piece rates or other productivity 
payments agency theory predicts that employees prefer to focus on their own work rather 
than offering their help in order to obtain a higher individual reward. By combining it with 
social-exchange theory it is expected that employees with individual piece rates would 
receive less assistance through reciprocation: team-members would prefer not to help them as 
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they would expect less or no assistance from their part. As for autonomy, I expect team-
members with high individual and/or group discretion to receive more help especially from 
the colleagues who they assisted before.  
 
      The Theory of Cooperation  
      The creative process specific of a team will be fruitful only if we pay attention to the 
attitude of workers and the relationships among them (Ditkoff et al, 2005). Creativity and 
cooperation can be also stimulated by creating the right match of task and goal 
interdependence and hence decreasing the possible negative effects of information asymmetry 
(Van der Vegt et al., 2003). 
       The issue of team working, and team member behaviour in particular, has been addressed 
by the theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949; De Dreu, 2007). In order to 
understand the psychological processes underlying team effectiveness this theory argues that 
people in groups generally perceive their goals and those of others to be cooperatively linked 
(“swim or sink together”). Thus, cooperative outcome interdependence is an important 
dimension of workgroups. DeDreu (2007) observed that the more team members perceive it 
the more they share information, the better they learn and higher the efficiency of the group. 
Using the theory of cooperation I expect that employees working in a group would generally 
see their goals as cooperatively linked and thus be keener to assist their colleagues especially 
when they receive a group-based reward (Bamberger and Levi, 2009). Consequently, a better 
understanding of the common goal of the company and of the team leads to proper efforts 
exercised by the employees and consequently to a higher cooperation among the members of 
the group. In this respect, helping behaviour depends on the perception of its members who 
may consider cooperation beneficial for their own interests. If the employees understand that, 
they will be eager and open to offer support to their colleagues.  
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        Other elements affecting OCB refer to job characteristics (Van Dyne, Graham and 
Dienesch ,1994) like autonomy as determinants of helping behaviour. Anderson and Williams 
(1996) found that task autonomy increased the incidence of employees’ seeking help from 
others and that this behaviour fostered the employees’ efforts to help others. Likewise, 
previous literature has argued that autonomy can increase employees’ perceived 
organizational support (Eisenberger, Cummings, Armeli, & Lynch, 1997; Eisenberger, 
Rhoades, & Cameron, 1999), an antecedent of OCB (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002). This 
phenomenon can be explained either through reciprocation, as argued in the previous section, 
employees preferring to assist the colleagues who helped them before or through genuine 
altruistic behavior like offering help to someone just because he or she is in need. Besides, in 
teams it is easier to notice the similarities among workers and to perceive somebody else’s 
goal as your own. On the other hand, when an employee with high individual and group 
autonomy receives more help we expect him or her to have a higher status in the group. If this 
person receives more help a “boss”-effect is present which annihilates the possibility of a 
good Samaritan behavior. Nevertheless, if workers with simultaneously high levels of 
individual and group discretion receive the same or less amount of help we witness a pure 
altruistic behavior induced by the premises of the theory of cooperation, kindness and no 
expectation of any type of compensation, material or intangible (i.e. assistance received in the 
future).  
        
Hypotheses Development 
        The literature review suggests that helping behaviour in a team can be influenced by the 
compensation system and by job design particularly, through autonomy. If genuine altruistic 
behaviors are present they cannot be directly controlled by the management as they are 
intrinsic and subjective characteristics of the employees. The only mechanisms through 
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which managers can objectively induce helping behavior are either the payment system 
applied or the amount of empowerment given at both individual and group level. The model 
explaining helping behavior developed in this paper captures the effects of these two 
variables by analyzing their influence alone or through interactions between them. Agency 
theory and social-exchange theory focus more on the “love of money” and reciprocity type of 
drivers, while the theory of cooperation brings a more altruistic explanation that goes beyond 
compensation and autonomy.   
 
Figure 1: A Model explaining Helping Behaviour in Teams  
  
 
        As noted before in this study, I assume that workers receive help either when somebody 
else has something to gain if he or she offers help (extrinsic motivation) or when somebody 
else wants to help only because he or she can -has the necessary autonomy to do it (intrinsic 
motivation). Building upon Tang et al. (2008) model which considers Good Samaritan 
behavior as intrinsic motivation versus love of money as extrinsic I assume that there is also 
another antecedent, the enabler, worker autonomy. These assumptions are summarized in the 
following figure: 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
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Figure 2: The assumption of receiving assistance in teams 
 
The first part of figure suggests that when employees have autonomy they help their 
teammates only if they have something to gain from this action in terms of monetary 
rewards or future reciprocal help. The second part of the figure shows that autonomy 
gives the ability, so it is a necessary condition but not sufficient: the help can come also 
from genuine concern for people, team or the organization. Consequently, potential Good 
Samaritan behavior, as a hidden driver, can be estimated through different variables in 
order to catch its effect on the amount of assistance received in teams. 
        
Stage I: Independent variables 
       From agency theory I infer that compensation based mainly or entirely on individual 
performance pay negatively affects cooperation inside the team as the worker would prefer to 
concentrate on his own work and performance rather than to assist his colleague. Building on 
agency theory concepts, individual piece rates or productivity payments make the employee 
less prone to offer his help. Adding now social-exchange theory premises, through the norm 
of reciprocity, I expect an employee who receives piece rates to enjoy less assistance from 
his colleagues as he did not offer help to other team-members. Consequently, as shown in 
Figure 1, I expect piece rates/productivity payments to have a negative effect on assistance 
received in teams. 
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       On the other hand, based on the theory of cooperation I expect that employees working 
in a group would generally see their goals as cooperatively linked. Nevertheless, they may 
prefer to assist their team-mates less when they receive an individual performance payment 
than when they enjoy a compensation based on team performance (Bamberger and Levi, 
2009) as the latter means a higher reward for the whole group so helping a colleague would 
indirectly be beneficial for them as well. In the case of individual piece rates employees 
focus more on their own work and tend to see their goals and the ones of the other team-
members less connected. Therefore, the potentially negative influence from the agency 
theory is considered to be higher than the potentially positive one derived from the theory of 
cooperation. So, through reciprocation, the introduction of piece rates is expected to decrease 
assistance received inside the team: 
   Hypothesis 1:  Piece rates or productivity payments have a negative influence on the 
amount of assistance received in teams 
 
       Individual and team-based autonomy  
         The connection between employee discretion (autonomy) and performance pay was 
explored by Prendergast (2002), Raith (2008) and Ortega (2009) who found a positive 
correlation between them due to the fact that complex jobs require more discretion and 
compensation based on performance “in order to take advantage of the employee’s specific 
knowledge” (Ortega, 2009). Following agency theory premises, it is expected to introduce 
also autonomy as a determinant of helping behavior as it is highly correlated with the 
compensation system and also considered a type of non-monetary reward (Lawler, 1971; 
Campion & Berger, 1990). 
         As noted before, employees need flexibility in order to be able to assist one another. 
Consequently, team-members with high autonomy are likely to offer their assistance and 
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applying the norm of reciprocity to their case, also to receive more help. By introducing 
autonomy into the analysis I gain a thorough perspective on the organization of work inside 
the team, and so I am able to consider the availability of the employees to help others as a 
variable that depends on the job design. This paper considers autonomy at both individual 
and group level. Team-autonomy is introduced in the analysis because of two reasons. First, 
at team level, individual autonomy is insufficient if it is not complemented with team 
autonomy (Spriggs, Jackson & Parker, 2000). Second, I assume that team-autonomy has a 
positive effect on employee helping behaviour as it leads team-members to share assistance 
due to the premises of theory of cooperation. The theory of cooperation emphasizes that 
employees working in a team tend to see their goals related. Moreover, DeDreu (2007) 
observed that the more team members perceive this the more they share information and 
consequently I expect them to offer more assistance to their colleagues. Consequently, I 
elaborate the second hypotheses of my study: 
    Hypothesis 2:  Individual autonomy has a positive influence on the amount of assistance 
received in teams 
    Hypothesis 3:  Team autonomy has a positive influence on the amount of assistance 
received in teams 
 
     Stage II: Combined effects of piece rates and individual autonomy 
        This paper considers autonomy as the enabler of giving help, so I expect its influence to 
be higher and more significant than the effect of the reward system. Moreover, it is 
interesting to study what happens if the compensation system is based on piece rates or other 
productivity payments and there is simultaneously high individual autonomy. As previously 
stated in the first hypotheses, the compensation has a negative effect and autonomy a positive 
influence on assistance received in teams. Nevertheless, previous literature on autonomy 
54 
 
found its influence on OCB highly significant either directly (Van Dyne, Graham and 
Dienesch, 1994; Anderson & Williams, 1996) or through mediators (Piccolo & Colquitt, 
2006; Chen & Chiu, 2009), while research regarding compensation based on productivity 
provided divided results: if group rewards increase cooperation behaviour (Miller & 
Hamblin, 1963; Bamberger & Levi, 2009) it was found that individual incentives decrease 
the amount of help offered to others (Encinosa, Gaynor & Rebitzer, 2007). Surprisingly, 
Wageman and Baker (1999) found that task and not reward interdependence drives helping 
behaviour. Thus, seeing that previous literature has divided results, my research proposes to 
analyze the determinants of helping behavior by combining a specific type of compensation 
with individual autonomy. Furthermore, by applying the norm of reciprocity, I predict that 
the combined effect of piece rates and individual discretion increases the amount of 
assistance received in teams:  
   Hypothesis 4:  The interaction between piece rates and individual autonomy has a 
positive influence on the amount of assistance received in teams 
 
       Stage III: Combined effects of individual and team-based autonomy  
       As argued in the theoretical framework, the justification for using autonomy as a 
moderator variable comes from the fact that employees need autonomy in order to be 
flexible and answer to assistance requests from other team-members. Nevertheless, high 
levels of team-autonomy may decrease individual autonomy as in this case decisions are 
shared rather than taken alone and responsibility is diffused instead of granted to one 
person (Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1998; Kirkman & Rosen, 1999). Moreover, I expect from 
social-exchange theory that an employee who enjoys both individual and team-based 
autonomy will receive more help due to the norms of reciprocity. Nonetheless, if I base my 
assumption on the theory of cooperation and the good Samaritan attitude I predict that 
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employee with simultaneously high levels of individual and team autonomy will receive 
less assistance as team-members offer their help from altruism not expecting hidden 
material or intangible rewards. Also, the case of both types of autonomy high could reflect 
the case of a higher status member in the team so if we receive less help in this context we 
assure that high position bias is accounted for. Therefore, I predict that the combined 
influence of individual and team-autonomy leads to less help offered in teams. Having too 
much responsibility may diminish the willingness to offer support. Thus, using social-
exchange theory I expect also the level of assistance received to decrease and consequently 
team-autonomy to work as a moderator of the relationship between individual autonomy 
and help received. Additionally, employees with simultaneously high levels of individual 
and team discretion may be perceived as higher-status members and others may feel 
obliged to help. Nevertheless, under the premises of theory of cooperation, I expect team-
members to assist each other out of pure altruism so irrespective of the status and 
obligation:  
Hypothesis 5:  Team-based autonomy moderates the relationship between individual 
autonomy and the amount of assistance received in teams. I expect the sense of the 
interaction to be negative. 
 
      Data and Methods 
      The data that I use in this paper comes also from the fourth European Working 
Conditions Survey conducted in 2005 by the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions. This survey provides an analysis of working conditions in 
the 27 countries of the European Union, in the two candidate countries (Turkey and Croatia), 
in Switzerland and Norway. In total, nearly 30.000 individual workers were interviewed in 
face-to-face interviews in their own homes between September and November of 2005, but I 
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kept the observations referring to employees working in a team. The unit of analysis is the 
individual and the observations are cross-national. The survey sampled the total active 
population of the respective nationalities of the EU member states, aged 15 years and over, 
resident in the countries involved in the survey. All the data that I use is from this survey and 
it refers to employees who are already working in a team.  
        Dependent variable:  the dependent variable is assistance received in teams measured 
as the assistance received by team-members from their colleagues if they ask for it. The 
question from the survey used to measure this variable is q25a: “You can get assistance from 
colleagues if you ask for it.” Responses were collected using a 5-point Likert-like scale (from 
1= “strongly disagree” to 5= “strongly agree”), 1 meaning that the respondent almost never 
receives assistance, 2 that he rarely receives it, 3 that sometimes he is assisted, 4 that he often 
gets supported and 5 that he  almost always receives assistance. I consider the distance among 
the intervals equally important. The survey has other two questions that refer to assistance, 
q25b and q25c which consider help received from superior and external help. Thus, in a 
group setting it can be inferred that colleagues who offer their assistance are fellow team-
members.  
        Independent variables: the explicative variables that I use in this study in order to 
contrast the hypotheses are piece rates or other productivity payments5 (PR), individual 
autonomy (index) and team autonomy. PR and team autonomy are dummy variables with 
levels 1 for applying PR and 0, otherwise and 1 for high team autonomy, 0 otherwise. Team 
autonomy is measured through the variable q26b_1a from the survey: “Do the members of 
the team decide by themselves on the division of tasks?” It is also assumed that if a team-
member enjoys team-autonomy, other team-member will enjoy it as well due to the definition 
                                                             
5 The Assistance variable refers to the help received by the respondent, whereas PR refer to the type of 
compensation received by the respondent. I would like to be able to use both sets of variables to refer to 
the same person (i.e.: help given by the respondent and pay received by the respondent).  Since, due to 
data availability, I do not have this information I have to work with assistance and pay received by the 
respondent. 
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of team-autonomy which answers to the following question from above. For instance, if a 
team-member who has team autonomy receives help, this must have been given by another 
group member who also enjoys team autonomy. 
        Moderator variable: team autonomy in hypothesis 5. 
    Employee behaviour refers also to perceived similarity to other team members and this 
was proved essential for individuals (Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). From 
here it may be inferred that employees prefer to assist other colleagues with similar 
attributes. Therefore, the need to control for certain variables:   
         Controls: are classified into individual, organizational and contextual. The individual 
group refers to the factors that are idiosyncratic to the workers: age, gender, education, tenure 
and occupation. Organizational factors refer to the size of the company while my contextual 
factors are external to the employee and to the organization and they represent the country of 
the survey and the type of industry6. 
        To test the hypotheses I estimate the following general assistance equation using 
Ordinary Least Squares7: 
Assistance received = F (PR, Individual Autonomy, Team-level Autonomy, 
IPP*Individual Autonomy, Individual Autonomy*Team Autonomy, Individual, 
Organizational & Contextual Characteristics) 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 For a detailed description of all the variables and of their expected effects see the Appendix. 
7 I used both OLS and O-LOGIT and I obtained similar results but in order to save space I will present 
only the results from the linear regression. 
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Results 
         I started to analyze the data by observing the descriptive statistics among the main 
variables of interest: piece rates, individual and team-level autonomy, age, gender, tenure and 
assistance. Then, I report a table with the correlations among the variables and finally test the 
hypotheses using OLS hierarchical regression analyses with four models: first, the basic 
model considers only the effect of control variables, the second one introduces direct effects, 
the third model considers also the influence of the moderator variable while the last model 
presents the most complete regression with interaction effects of the independent variables.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  N Mean SD Min Max 
1. Piece rates or productivity 
payments 8785 0.12 0.32 0 1 
2. Individual autonomy 9666 2.12 1.09 0 3 
3. Team autonomy 8126 0.61 0.49 0 1 
4. Age 9867 40.17 11.54 15 99 
5. Gender 9885 0.52 0.50 0 1 
6. Tenure 9784 10.04 9.82 0 60 
7. Assistance received in teams 8212 4.46 0.91 1 5 
8. Assistance received by    
    employees not working in a team 1583 4.22 0.03 1 5 
       
          Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables of my research. Piece 
rates (PR), individual autonomy and team autonomy are the independent variables that 
influence employee assistance received in teams, while age, gender and tenure are control 
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variables describing the individuals. What is interesting to observe is that respondents 
generally received a high amount of assistance (4.46) and PR are not very common the mean 
is around 0. Also, I see that the average individual autonomy is 2.12 representing about two 
thirds of the total potential. Team autonomy is more balanced as its mean is 0.61 and tenure 
in a company is around 10 years. 
          Table 2 presents the correlations between the main variables of my research. I notice a 
negative and significant correlation between PR and individual autonomy (-0.07) and 
between PR and autonomy at team level (-0.05).  There is also a negative correlation between 
team autonomy and gender (-0.07). Positive and highly significant correlations are found 
between PR and gender (0.08), between TBR and gender (0.05) and between team autonomy 
and assistance (0.08). The highest correlations are between individual and team autonomy 
(0.21) and between age and tenure (0.57).  I also did a mean comparison test between the 
mean assistance received by the employees working in a team and the rest and I obtained that 
the difference between the groups was significantly different and people working in teams 
received more help:  4.46 compared to 4.22 (p <.01). 
Table 2: Correlations among the main variables 
Variable  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Piece rates or productivity payments -      
2. Individual autonomy -0.07● -     
3. Team autonomy -0.05● 0.22● -    
4. Age -0.04● 0.03● 0.01 -   
5. Gender   0.08●    0.01  -0.07● -0.01 -  
6. Tenure -0.04● 0.04●    -0.00   0.57● 0.02 - 
7. Assistance received in teams -0.05● 0.14●    0.11● -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 
●Significant correlations using Spearman test correspond to p<.01 
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         Table 3 presents the results of steps that I followed for testing the hypotheses. The 
assistance equation is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. In Step 1 I consider only the 
effects of the control variables on assistance received in teams, Step 2 adds direct effects of 
PR and individual autonomy, step 3 considers also the moderator effect of team autonomy 
while the last step adds interaction effects between PR and individual autonomy and between 
individual and team-level autonomy. As noted before in the first stage of the analysis I 
focused on the direct effects of the independent variables. The first conclusion is that PR do 
not influence significantly the amount of assistance received in teams in any of the models 
meaning that hypothesis 1 is not supported. Hence, employees who receive PR do not receive 
less assistance from their colleagues.  As for hypothesis 2 we observe that the coefficient of 
individual autonomy (H2) is positive and highly significant in all the models: 0.0787, 0.0685 
and 0.0581 all for p<.01. Remember that Hypotheses 3 asserts that team autonomy affects 
positively the amount of assistance received in teams. Results from Table 3 confirm this 
hypothesis as the coefficient of autonomy at group level is positive and significant in all the 
models: 0.0931 and 0.0887 (p<.01).   
        In the next stage of the analysis, hypothesis 4, I consider the interaction between piece 
rates (or other productivity payments) and individual autonomy. Results from Table 3 show 
that the coefficient of this combined variable is positive and significant (0.0636) for a p<.05 
suggesting that this hypothesis is also supported. What is interesting to notice is that PR 
alone do not affect assistance but in combination with individual autonomy they have a 
positive influence meaning that the positive effect of individual autonomy is so strong that it 
prevails also when it is used together with other variable. From a managerial point of view, 
this suggests that team members who receive PR do not receive more help but employees 
who enjoy both PR and individual autonomy receive also more assistance. The intrinsic 
motivation of this behaviour could lie in one of the following situations: either employees 
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may base their decisions on norms of reciprocity expecting that team-members with more 
autonomy will also be able to help them in the future, or employees may consider that team 
members with both PR and individual autonomy have a higher status in the group and is their 
obligation to help them. Either way, this hypothesis does not indicate a good Samaritan 
behaviour. However, combining it with the finding from the regression with fixed (regular) 
salary- it was obtained that team-members with fixed salary receive significantly more help- 
I may infer that employees tend to assist one another unconditioned by the level of 
autonomy. 
        In the last stage of the results I study the potential moderator effect of team autonomy as 
predicted by hypothesis 5. Findings from model 4 confirm this hypothesis as the coefficient 
of individual autonomy is positive and significant (0.0581 at p<.01), the coefficient of team-
based autonomy is also positive and significant (0.0887 at p<.01) while the coefficient of the 
interaction between these two variables is negative and significant as expected (-0.0212 at 
p<.05). This result confirms that having too much responsibility may diminish the 
willingness to offer support. Moreover, it suggests that team members do not offer their help 
to a higher-status member (the boss effect) with both levels of individual and team autonomy 
high, as the coefficient of the interaction is not positive. Thus, in line with social-exchange 
theory I observe that team-members offer their help basing their decisions on both objective 
reasons like actual freedom or discretion to move across and assist their colleagues 
(autonomy) and on more subjective and altruistic motivations like offering help to fellow 
team-members in need (good Samaritan attitude).  
         I also ran O-LOGIT regression and I obtained similar findings, backing the majority of 
the hypotheses8. However, the only difference found regards the interaction between 
                                                             
8In order to check if our results are robust to a more general structure of errors, I ran tests with robust 
standard errors clustering after countries and I obtained the same significant results confirming the 
hypotheses. 
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individual and team autonomy which was not found significant suggesting that under some 
specifications the effect is significant (when using OLS) but it is not robust (the effect does 
not maintain under O-LOGIT). In order to study the potential effect of other type of 
performance-based compensation on the amount of assistance received I introduced team-
based rewards in the regression but the coefficient of this variable came out insignificant. 
Thus, the promise of a shared reward does not influence helping behavior in groups. 
        Consequently, both individual and team-based autonomy are essential when it comes to 
assistance received in teams. As for the compensation type it was found that piece rates have 
an effect only in combination with individual autonomy potentially suggesting either a 
“boss”-effect, a very strong and overwhelming effect of individual autonomy or an 
uncovered motivator role of individual performance pay. For instance, employees who 
receive piece rates may consider offering assistance as beneficial through perceiving more 
rewards from sharing or helping (Siemsen et al., 2007) and consequently, if they also enjoy 
autonomy, receive more help due to the norm of reciprocity.  
 
Table 3. Hierarchical regression analysis for piece rates and autonomy predicting 
assistance received in teams 
 
Variables  1 2 3 4* 
 
Piece rates or 
productivity payments 
 
 
- 
 
-.0308 
(0.03) 
 
-.0326 
(0.03) 
 
-.0214 
(0.03) 
 
Individual autonomy 
 
 
- 
 
    .0787●●● 
(0.01) 
 
.0685●●● 
(0.01) 
 
.0581●●● 
(0.01) 
 
Team Autonomy 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
.0931●●● 
(0.02) 
 
.0887●●● 
(0.02) 
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Piece rates x Individual 
autonomy 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
.0636●● 
(0.03) 
 
Individual Autonomy x 
Team Autonomy 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-.0212●● 
(0.01) 
Individual 
 
Age 
 
 
Gender 
 
 
Tenure 
 
 
Job title 
dummies 
 
     -.0056●●● 
      (0.00) 
     
 .0795●●● 
(0.02) 
 
.0006 
(0.00) 
 
Yes 
 
 
-.0049●●● 
 (0.00) 
 
 .0640●●● 
(0.02) 
 
.0005 
(0.00) 
 
Yes 
 
-.0042●●● 
(0.00)   
 
0786●●● 
(0.02) 
 
.0006 
(0.00) 
 
Yes 
 
-.0041●●● 
(0.00) 
 
  .0762●●● 
(0.02) 
 
.0005 
(0.00) 
 
Yes 
 
Organizational 
 
Size dummies 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Contextual 
 
Industry dummies 
 
Country dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 
 
 9745  8488  7008  7008 
R2  0.0818 0.0936 0.0855 0.0868 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0762 0.0871 0.0774 0.0784 
Root MSE 
 
.87557 .85395 .81723 .81678 
  Notes:  The Assistance equation is estimated by OLS 
• p<.1 
•• p<.05     
••• p<.01 
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* In this model I tested a regression with fixed salary also and found its influence on the amount of 
assistance received positive and significant 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
         The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between performance pay, 
autonomy and employee helping behaviour in teams. In order to study the hypotheses of 
interest I considered also the role of individual and team-level autonomy. 
         Several important findings emerge from this study. First, the results show that in the 
first stage of the analysis (H1, H2 and H3) Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 are entirely 
supported, while hypothesis 1 is not supported. Therefore, it seems that piece rates or other 
productivity payments are not associated with low helping behaviour. The results show that 
even if the coefficient of piece rates is negative in all the models (-0.03; -0.03 and -0.02) 
there is no significant connection between them and the amount of assistance received in 
teams. On the other hand, as expected, both individual and team autonomy influence 
positively the amount of help received in work groups. With respect to individual autonomy 
it may also be that employees with high levels of task discretion enjoy also higher status in 
the team and other employees may feel obliged to offer their help. In the second stage of the 
analysis, when considering the interaction between piece rates and individual autonomy (H4) 
I find a positive effect on assistance, as predicted by the model. The coefficient of this 
variable (0.06) is higher than the coefficient of individual autonomy (0.05) suggesting that 
the effect of individual autonomy increases when combined with productivity payments. The 
shape of this interaction is illustrated in Figure 3: 
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 This figure reflects that in the case of low individual autonomy employees who are paid 
according to piece rates receive almost the same amount of assistance as team-members who 
do not receive productivity payments. Nevertheless, in the case of high individual autonomy, 
employees with piece rates receive more help. An explanation for this could be that once 
given high autonomy employees paid according to their productivity are prone to offer and 
consequently receive more help. This confirms H4 which stated the importance of the 
positive effect of autonomy. 
         Finally, in stage III, the interaction between individual and team autonomy is found 
negative and significant supporting Hypothesis 5. Consequently, as both coefficients of 
individual and team autonomy are positive and significant while their interaction is negative 
and significant, team autonomy plays the moderating role between individual autonomy and 
help received in groups.  
The shape of the interaction is shown in Figure 4: 
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This suggests that when given high levels of both individual and team autonomy team-
members receive more assistance. However, in the case of low individual autonomy, 
employees with high team autonomy receive more help confirming that at least one type of 
autonomy is required in order to benefit from colleagues assistance. I observe that employees 
with high individual and team autonomy alone receive more help indicating a potential norm 
of reciprocity along with Good Samaritan predictions. Nevertheless, in the case of employees 
with simultaneously high individual and team autonomy we find less assistance suggesting 
that team workers offer their help from altruism and because they are able to do so than 
basing their decisions on reciprocity expectations. As argued before, having simultaneously 
high both types of autonomy I control for the potential effect of a high status member who 
received help from his or her colleagues who may feel obligated to respond to requests of 
help. Having found the effect of total autonomy on the amount of assistance received 
negative rules out the “boss” effect. Consequently, it looks like hypothesis 5 sheds some light 
on why team-members receive help. If at the beginning there were four possibilities: either 
because of the compensation, of the norms of reciprocity, of the “boss” effect or genuine 
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altruism now we found that the compensation is not significant (H1 not supported) and the 
reciprocal behavior and “boss” effect are ruled out (H5 supported). Therefore, the good 
Samaritan attitude is present in teams. 
         An implication of these findings is that managers should offer employee autonomy- 
individual or team-based but not simultaneously both- in order to be able to answer to other 
requests of help. Surprisingly, it appears that when workers receive productivity rewards and 
simultaneously enjoy high autonomy they receive more assistance from their colleagues, 
suggesting that the effect of high individual autonomy is very powerful.  
        
Limitations, Future Research and Managerial Implications  
        This study presents some limitations that have to be looked at carefully. First, this 
research is a cross-sectional analysis; there is only one period of time, between September 
and November of 2005. It would be interesting to study if the findings change when we 
conduct a time series analysis. The second limitation of this study is due to data availability: 
the survey does not offer information about team composition or the exact percentage of 
piece rates or productivity payments applied, the data showing only if employees receive this 
type of compensation or not. The same shortcoming refers to the payment based on group 
performance. For future research it would be interesting to compare the percentage of piece 
rates with the percentage of team-based compensation. Another limitation refers to data 
availability about genuine altruistic behaviors. This paper estimated genuine help trough 
different variables but it is important to study its effects through questions that regard it 
directly. However, due to the nature of altruism, it is a construct difficult to measure and we 
may overcome the shortcomings of a general survey by developing a more focused 
questionnaire with questions that capture true Good Samaritan attitudes (and even then these 
can be biased: for instance in the case of a small team honest answers can create disruption). 
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It will be also interesting to study the amount of help given in teams in order to have a more 
direct relationship as the independent and dependent variables refer in this case to the same 
person.   
         Another direction for future research would be to investigate the role of task 
interdependence when it comes to helping behaviour as providing more help was associated 
with help givers having higher individual autonomy and jobs interdependent with the help-
seekers’ jobs (Anderson & Williams, 1996). It would be interesting to find a proxy for this 
variable and study its effect on helping behaviour in the context of this paper. Researchers 
may also be interested in the personality type of the employee (Tang, Sutarso, 
Davis, Dolinski, Ibrahim and Wagner, 2007) in terms of intrinsec and extrinsic motivations 
in order to reveal genuine altruistic behavior. 
         Finally, the contribution of this study demonstrates that both individual and team-based 
autonomy influence positively the amount of assistance received in teams. Moreover, when 
individual autonomy interacts with piece rates its effect is increased while when it interacts 
with team autonomy its combined effect diminished. The last finding confirms precious 
research which considered the cancelation effect obtained when one uses both types of 
autonomy (Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1998; Kirkman & Rosen, 1999). 
         Taken together, my results imply that both productivity based rewards and autonomy 
are important tools when it comes to determining employee helping behaviour. Managers 
should know when to introduce rewards based only on individual merits so as to keep their 
workers motivated and willing to help their team-mates. Moreover, managers should give 
employees autonomy in order to be able to move across and offer their assistance to others. 
As for genuine altruistic behaviour encompassed through the term of “the good Samaritan” it 
seems that employees who receive help are the ones with high individual or team autonomy 
and the ones with productivity based-salaries and high job discretion. Consequently, the only 
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true altruism could come from the case of team autonomy, case in which employees help 
because they perceive their goals and the ones of other team members as related and they 
either expect reciprocity in the future (not true altruism) or simply help because it is easier in 
this context to share and see the similarities among people in teams (good Samaritan 
attitude). By carefully examining the results we observe that employees with high individual 
or team autonomy alone receive more help indicating a potential norm of reciprocity along 
with Good Samaritan predictions. Nevertheless, in the case of employees with 
simultaneously high individual and team autonomy we find less assistance suggesting that 
team workers offer their help from altruism and because they are able to do so than basing 
their decisions on reciprocity expectations.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Team Participation and Career Advancement 
 
“Great teamwork is the only way we create the breakthroughs that define our careers.” 
(Pat Riley) 
 
 
Introduction 
         The goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship between team affiliation and career 
advancement prospects by thoroughly investigating both the determinants and consequences 
of group participation. Scholars usually consider teams as groups of people who work 
together for the accomplishment of a common goal set by a higher authority in the firm. The 
goal could be temporary, as in case of project or problem-solving teams or permanent as in 
the case of production teams. Team working has become widely used in the last decades, 
being praised for its advantages for productivity (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Hamilton, 
Nickerson & Owan, 2003), cooperation (Miller and Hamblin; 1963, Rosenbaum et al., 1980; 
Shea and Guzzo, 1989; Van der Vegt et al, 2003; Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer, 2007; 
Bamberger and Levi, 2009) and knowledge sharing (Siemsen, Balasubramanian & Roth, 
2007). However, the direct effect of team affiliation on career advancement has received little 
attention.  
        With respect to the consequences of team affiliation, the evident connection between 
productivity and promotion has been thoroughly studied in previous literature (Doeringer & 
Piore, 1971; Seltzer & Merrett, 2000; Baker, Gibbs & Homstrom, 1994a; Devaro, 2006) but 
the complex set of variables (individual and group characteristics such as the level of 
education, tenure, individual and team autonomy) that affect advancement beyond this needs 
further investigation. Moreover, once inside the team, it is interesting to analyze which 
factors, individual or group characteristics, may affect perceived career advancement 
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prospects. Among the individual variables, previous literature has focused mainly on 
employee age and gender. My research considers that there are also other individual 
characteristics that may affect employee participation in teams and career advancement such 
as employee´s level of education (Spilerman & Lunde, 1991; Chao & Ngai, 2001) and tenure 
(Ishida, Su & Spilerman, 1995).     
         Another individual characteristic that influences employee perceived satisfaction and 
helping behavior is individual autonomy (Godeanu, 2009; Godeanu, 2010). But does it affect 
promotion perspectives as well? Past literature considered that at team level, individual 
autonomy is insufficient unless it is not complemented with team autonomy (Spriggs, Jackson 
& Parker, 2000). Thus, for group characteristics, my research proposes to examine team 
autonomy in the form of both team members´ choices upon the division of tasks and as 
discretion over the choice of the team leader. Consequently, this paper aims at narrowing the 
gap from previous literature by analyzing both the antecedents and consequences of team 
affiliation through studying the effects of education, tenure and employee discretion on career 
prospects. 
 
Antecedents and Consequences of Team Affiliation  
 
       Before analyzing the consequences of team participation we should first examine its 
antecedents. To start with, employee characteristics could provide a good insight in 
understanding why people work in teams. According to employee learning, education 
attainment and tenure should determine to a great degree firms´ decision to create teams.      
A limitation of the previous literature is that it did not analyze thoroughly the effect of 
worker heterogeneity on worker selection or participation in teams.  Therefore, it will be 
interesting to study how different employee characteristics affect team affiliation. Given 
that literature has examined team participation mainly for productivity reasons (Hamilton, 
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Nickerson and Owan, 2003) I aim to take a step further by examining other rationales for 
team participation and the effect of team affiliation on career prospects. Bonet (2008) has 
found that seniority is no longer the unique criteria for advancement and that the value of 
experience changes once individuals accumulate further education. Hence, it is important to 
analyze to what extent employees’ experience and education influence their voluntary or 
assigned participation in a team. Will high-educated and high-experienced workers be more 
probably part of a group? And once people freely decide to be part of a team or are assigned 
to one by the management which individual or job design characteristics lead to higher 
career advancement prospects? 
      This research proposes to empirically explore these questions. The goal is to 
determine the extent to which individual characteristics contribute to employee 
allocation to teams and the link between team participation and career advancement. 
Teams have become widely used in the last decades and their advantages for 
productivity (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Hamilton, Nickerson & Owan, 2003), 
cooperation (Miller and Hamblin; 1963, Rosenbaum et al., 1980; Shea and Guzzo, 
1989; Van der Vegt et al, 2003; Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer, 2007; Bamberger and 
Levi, 2009) and knowledge sharing (Siemsen, Balasubramanian & Roth, 2007) have 
been already acknowledged. Nevertheless, the direct effect of team affiliation on career 
opportunity has not yet been discussed. Likewise, once inside the team, it is interesting 
to analyze also which factors, individual or group characteristics, may affect perceived 
promotion prospects. 
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Determinants of Team Affiliation  
         While past literature established the relationship between worker ability (i.e. skills) and 
team productivity (Hamilton et al. 2003) it offers few insights into how employee 
heterogeneity in terms of education attainment and tenure affects team affiliation. A benefit 
of heterogeneity derives from mutual learning (Lazear, 1998). As Hamilton, Nickerson and 
Owan (2003) argue more skillful workers in terms of technical abilities “might teach the less 
skillful how to execute tasks better and more quickly” but knowledge transfer among workers 
may be enhanced when employees possess collaborative skills facilitating learning. Also, in 
garment industry informal training by other team members is widely spread (Berg et al., 
1996) while small businesses prefer informal learning processes as well (Marlow, 1998; 
Billett et al., 2003). The empirical work of Tannenbaum (1997) and Billett (2001) found co-
workers as being relevant sources of work-related learning while in Coetzer (2007) study 
workmates represent the most useful source of learning. 
           If previous literature was concerned mainly with diversity of worker ability in terms of 
performance (Hamilton et al., 2003) I take a step further and investigate other individual 
characteristics that may determine an employee to be part of a team (i.e. tenure and 
education). Either workers decide by themselves or are assigned to different teams it is 
important to study which are the antecedents of team affiliation beyond productivity. Teams 
benefit not only from technical and collaborative skills but also from socialization which 
contributes to more enjoyable tasks. Psychologists consider that increasing variety and 
significance of tasks while enhancing social interaction leads to higher intrinsic motivation 
(Staw et al., 1980) which in turn could raise employee involvement, cooperation and career 
prospects. Coetzer (2007) finds that respondents with no post-school qualifications and 
workers with shorter tenure regarded their work environment conditions in terms of learning 
opportunities more favorably indicating that higher education and tenure represent an 
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important source of learning for them. Thus employees´ tenure and education are essential 
when it comes to learning inside organizations. Moreover, teams are considered important 
sources of learning and knowledge sharing (Hamilton et al., 2003; Siemsen, Balasubramanian 
& Roth, 2007). According to this view I expect that employees with higher education level 
and tenure to participate in teams in order to inspire and teach their co-workers (i.e. 
employees with higher tenure know better the policies, the routines and the behavior of the 
company). 
 
Consequences of Team Affiliation 
       Even if the connection between productivity and promotion was studied thoroughly 
in previous literature (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Seltzer & Merrett, 2000; Baker, Gibbs 
& Homstrom, 1994a; Devaro, 2006) the complex set of variables that affect 
advancement beyond this needs further investigation. Scholars consider teams as 
important sources of learning and knowledge sharing (Hamilton et al., 2003; Siemsen, 
Balasubramanian & Roth, 2007). Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) find that 
heterogeneous teams in terms of high and low-skilled workers were more productive. 
From social networks theory perspective, teams with strong interpersonal ties or teams 
that are central in their intergroup network tend to perform better (Balkundi & Harrison, 
2006). Thus, how performance is connected to promotion, being part of this type of 
groups implies higher probability of career advancement. Consequently, following 
previous literature findings that connect productivity and promotions directly, I expect 
that working in teams has also an effect on career advancement: 
            H1: Team affiliation increases perceived career advancement prospects 
         While previous literature documents the impact of education on career 
advancement (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Jencks et al., 1972, Mincer, 1974; Rosenbaum, 
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1979, Wise, 1975b, Spilerman & Lunde, 1991; Chao & Ngai, 2001) it also offers mixed 
results. On one hand education is regarded as an important signal about the competence 
level or productivity of an employee (Gintis, 1971; Arrow, 1972; Spence, 1973; 
Spilerman & Lunde , 1991) but on the other hand it is argued that there is no direct link 
between higher education and promotion, considering competency level and the level of 
competitiveness as main requirements for good career prospects (Chao and Ngai, 2001). 
        In addition, the status-attainment literature assumes that the number of years of 
schooling captures the full effect of education (Faia, 1981) while economists consider 
that labor force experience can be substituted for schooling (Blaug, 1976; Sicherman, 
1991). However, both economists and sociologists agree that education credentials or 
certification of a specific degree, regarded as different from years of schooling, convey 
relevant information about the minimum standard of performance (Faia, 1981; Collins, 
1979; Spilerman & Lunde, 1991). Spilerman and Lunde (1991) find that education, 
measured through the numbers of years of schooling, credentials, quality of the 
undergraduate school and college major, varies with organizational rank and that firms 
do not reward educational background alone but only when it contributes to 
productivity. However, employees may gain additional skills or abilities from education 
that substitute for work skills (Bonet, 2008) and thus education by itself can represent a 
valuable asset.  
          Even if previous literature regarding the relationship between education and career 
advancement offered mixed results, in the framework of human capital model, educational 
credentials enhance productivity (Gintis, 1971; Arrow, 1973). Spilerman & Lunde (1991) 
claim that credentials “tap heterogeneity among workers rather than differences in learned 
skills”(p. 693). In line with this, I predict that higher the education level attained higher the 
perceived career opportunities: 
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          H2a: The level of education influence team members´ career advancement 
       The issue of labor force experience has also been a focus of past research. This 
theme has been presented differently. The late selection model states that employees in 
the same entry level who share the same educational level also have a similar career 
progression during the first years at a company (Tachibanaki, 1992; Tomita, 1992; 
Ishida, Su & Spilerman, 2002). Examining promotion profiles of Japanese employees 
with college degrees working in a manufacturing company, Matsushige (1995) shows 
that no one was promoted to managerial rank in the first ten years. Likewise, using a 
survey of 640 Japanese firms Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Kiko (1993), find that about two-
thirds of the respondents were not differentiated during five years after entering into the 
company. This late selection is possible in Japan due to the limited opportunities for 
former employees in the external market (Prendergast, 1992). Nevertheless, the 
tournament model stating that employees with faster promotion rates in initial ranks 
have better advancement prospects in subsequent ranks, characterizes the majority of 
firms (Hanada, 1987; Ishida, Su & Spilerman, 2002). Baker, Gibbs & Holmstrom 
(1994a) look at the internal organization of the firm, especially at the number of people 
who move from one job title to another and find that initially, the new employees are 
promoted more quickly than the incumbents. Likewise, they find that people are always 
promoted after five years, confirming the prediction of the late selection model and also 
evidence of “fast tracks” supporting the tournament model. 
      Consequently, past literature predicted different outcomes with respect to the 
relationship between tenure and promotions. While the late selection model predicts that 
high tenure increases the probability of advancement, according to the tournament 
theory employees promoted first have an advantage “in retaining the right to compete 
for higher position” (Ishida, Su & Spilerman, 2002: p.181). Following, the premises of 
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late selection model and noticing that researchers find a fix period in which employees 
are retained at the same job title, I expect that perceived career opportunities increase 
with tenure:  
      H2b: The higher the number of years spent in a firm the higher team members´ perceived   
               career advancement prospects 
        
Employee discretion and career prospects 
        Another individual characteristic that deserves particular attention is autonomy. Previous 
research finds that it influences both satisfaction (Lawler, 1971; Greenberg, 2006; Haar & 
Spell, 2009; Godeanu, 2009) and cooperation (Tjosvold and Yu, 2004; Oosterhof, Van der 
Vegt, Van de Vliert and Sanders, 2009; Godeanu, 2010). Furthermore, Bonet (2008) finds a 
positive association between promotions and high involvement jobs suggesting the 
importance of employee discretion. Taking into consideration its essential role when it comes 
to employee behavior it will be interesting to investigate if autonomy affects perceived career 
prospects as well.  
         This paper explores the influence of individual discretion on promotion as I expect that 
higher employee control over his methods, speed of work or his tasks increases his perceived 
opportunities. In general and especially in teams, if workers have control over their tasks they 
may perceive that they have an important part in the company and may expect a promotion in 
the near future: 
           H3: Within teams, individual autonomy leads to high perceived career prospects 
        In addition, in a team setting, scholars claimed that individual autonomy is insufficient 
unless it is complemented with team autonomy (Spriggs, Jackson & Parker, 2000). Thus, this 
paper considers autonomy at both individual and group level. My research proposes to 
examine team autonomy in the form of team’s freedom of choice over both the division of 
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tasks and the team leader. People may consider that enjoying this discretion may convey a 
positive signal regarding their career opportunities. For instance, having the freedom to 
choose a team leader from the group increases the probability of one’s promotion as a type of 
self-fulfilling prophecy: when employees have control over who will lead their team (who 
will be promoted) they also control their own career prospects. Therefore, I predict that high 
team discretion measured in both forms leads to expected career advancement: 
       
      H4a: Team autonomy in the form of team choice over the division of tasks increases  
              perceived career opportunities 
     H4b: Team autonomy in the form of team freedom of choice over the team leader leads to 
             high perceived career prospects 
 
Methodology: 
           The data that I use in this paper comes from the fourth European Working Conditions 
Survey conducted in 2005 by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions which provides an analysis of working conditions in the 27 countries of 
the European Union, in the two candidate countries (Turkey and Croatia), in Switzerland and 
Norway. The unit of analysis is the individual and the observations are cross-national. The 
survey sampled the total active population of the respective nationalities of the EU member 
states, aged 15 years and over, resident in the countries involved in the survey.  
         Team Affiliation: dependent variable in the first part of the analysis and independent in 
the second part. It uses variable q26b from the survey: “Does your job involve doing all or 
part of your work in a team?” and is a dummy variable which takes value 1 for team-members 
and 0, otherwise. 
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         Education: independent variable in both parts of this study. It uses ISCED classification 
of education from the survey “the highest level of education or training” and has a dummy 
variable for each of the 7 levels (i.e. no education, primary education, lower, upper and post 
secondary education, tertiary education-first level and tertiary education-advanced level). 
        Tenure: independent variable. Represents the number of years a respondent has been 
employed at his/her current company. It -uses variable q2d from the survey 
        Individual Autonomy: explanatory variable representing an index variable which 
combines three dummy variables: employee methods of work, the order of tasks and the 
speed of work. It uses variable q24a,b,c from the survey. This paper follows the construction 
of task autonomy from Molleman (2009): “task autonomy reflects the freedom an employee 
has to make decisions about goals (what), work methods (how), and planning issues (when)” 
but it does not limit individual autonomy to task autonomy, as it considers also the order of 
tasks. 
         Team Autonomy: is an independent variable measured through two different dummy 
variables variable: variable q26b_1a from the survey: “Do the members of the team decide by 
themselves on the division of tasks?” and variable q26b_1b “Do the members of the team 
decide by themselves who will be head of the team?”. Each of these variables takes value 1 
for the positive answer and 0, otherwise. I added group discretion to individual autonomy by 
following the arguments from the previous literature that considered advisable to look at 
multiple levels (Seibert, Silver and Randolph, 2004). Moreover, Spriggs, Jackson & Parker, 
(2000) argued that autonomy should be “truly collective, distributed throughout the team so 
that each team-member must have both autonomy to act and the ability to influence others to 
act”.              
         Controls: are classified into individual, organizational and contextual. The individual 
group refers to the factors that are idiosyncratic to the workers: age, gender and occupation. 
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Organizational factors refer to the size of the company while my contextual factors are 
external to the employee and to the organization and they represent the country of the survey 
and the type of industry9. 
 
Results     
  The analysis was started by observing the descriptive statistics and correlations among the 
main variables considered potential antecedents of team affiliation: education level and 
tenure, and other individual control variables: age, gender, individual autonomy and job 
title.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations (Part I) 
Variable N Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
 
1.Team 
Affiliation 
 
24706 0.5978 .4903 1       
 
2. Education 
level 
 
25009 3.3406 1.2853 0.1123* 1      
 
3. Tenure 
 
24586 9.8887 10.0040 0.0060 -0.0214* 1     
 
4. Age 
 
24965 40.8872 12.0131 -0.0359* -0.0177* 0.4966* 1    
 
5. Gender 
 
25009 0.4978 0.5000 0.0271* -0.1005* 0.0644* 0.0052 1   
 
6. Individual 
autonomy 
 
24978 2.0734 1.1330 -0.0531* 0.1763* 0.0834* 0.0723* 0.0216* 1  
 
7. Job title 
 
25009 5.0091 2.6051 -0.0604* -0.4868* -0.0949* -0.0597* 0.1210* -0.2305* 1 
 
*Significant correlations using Spearman test correspond to p<.05 
                                                             
9 For a detailed description of all the variables and of their expected effects see the Appendix. 
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        What is interesting to observe in table 1 is that is that team working is moderately 
distributed among the respondents, the mean value of the coefficient being 0.5978, out of 1. 
Education level has a mean of 3.3406 out of 6 suggesting that employees present an average 
level situated between upper and post-secondary education. The average tenure at a 
company is around 10 years (9.8887), the average age around 40 (40.8872) and the sample 
is equally distributed between men and women (0.4978). As for individual autonomy we 
observe that generally workers enjoy a moderately towards high level of discretion, its 
coefficient being 2.073410. The most common job title belongs to service workers, shop and 
market sales workers, with a corresponding value of 5. Regarding the correlations part of 
the table, we note significant correlations (p<.05) between all the variables expect between 
gender and age and, contrary to our expectations, between tenure and team affiliation. 
         In the following analysis, results for sub-samples of respondents within the 
demographic variables of interest are presented facilitating the comparison of means 
regarding team affiliation. In presenting the findings relating to education and tenure, the 
focus is on the two sub-sets of employees considered most probably to be part of a team: 
newcomers and/or low educated workers who would most likely have to face learning 
processes inside the firm from employees with longer work experience in the organizations 
and/or highly educated. Following the distinction of Coetzer (2007) we consider as 
newcomers workers with tenures of less than two years and we compare their results to the 
results for employees with longer tenure (over six years). Similarly, the results for low 
educated workers (no education or primary education) will be compared to the results for 
high educated respondents (tertiary education). Such comparisons may offer an insight of 
the antecedents of team affiliation from a learning stand point. Results from Table 2 
indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between team-members and 
                                                             
10 Individual autonomy is an index variable with values 0, 1, 2 or 3. When the index has value 0 it means 
that the employee has no discretion over his methods of work, speed or order of tasks, while a value of 3 
suggests that the employee has complete discretion over all of these three measures. 
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employees not working in a team with respect to career prospects, confirming through a 
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test that team-members had higher rank (z = -13.935, 
p = 0.000). This finding is in line with hypothesis 2 which predicts that team affiliation 
leads to higher career opportunities. As for tenure, we note that there is no significant 
difference between newcomers and employees with tenure higher than 6 years with respect 
to team participation. However, when it comes to promotions, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the group of newcomers and the group of old-timers: Pearson 
chi2(4) = 174.8521, Pr = 0.000. On the other hand, the difference in education level, 
between low (no education or primary) versus high (tertiary) was significant for both team 
affiliation: Pearson chi2(1) = 248.1102, Pr = 0.000 and career prospects: Pearson chi2(4) = 
767.6553,  Pr = 0.000.  
 
Table 2a. Team Affiliation as a function of education and tenure differences: 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Test statistics: chi2 
Low education 0.4666 0.4990 
248.1102*** 
High education 0.6623 0.4730 
Newcomers 0.5914 0.4916 
0.8906 
Oldcomers 0.5984 0-4902 
***Pr<0.01 
 
 
 
Table 2b. Career opportunities as a function of education, tenure and team participation: 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Test statistics: 
Low education 2.1065 1.1315 
767.6563*** 
High education 2.9923 1.2461 
Newcomers 2.7223 1.3011 
174.8521*** 
Oldcomers 2.5402 1.2048 
Team members 2.6976 1.2429 
-13.9350*** 
Not team members 2.4732 1.2244 
***Pr<0.01 
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Which variables are associated with team participation? 
       In table 3 we report the findings from three models: model 1 considers our independent 
variable and only individual controls, model 2 presents also industry and country effects, 
while the last model adds the influence of all control variables. Results of the logistic 
regression suggest that in the first two models post-secondary and tertiary education 
(compared to no education) and tenure are important for team participation, confirming that 
higher level of education and tenure lead to higher probability of team affiliation. 
Nevertheless, when we consider the influence of all the controls, the effects of education 
and tenure disappear. The only variable that makes the difference from model 2 to model 3 
is company size: when we control for small, medium and large firm dummies we find that 
all these categories, compared to micro-enterprise, are significant for team participation, in 
the sense that as higher the size of the company, higher the probability of forming teams. 
The coefficient for small enterprise is 2.08 (p<0.01), for medium is higher 2.1441 (p<.01) 
and for large firms is the highest, 2.8885 (p<0.01).  
         In all three models, when we control for individual, firm and contextual characteristics 
simultaneously, age, gender and individual autonomy were found significant (p<.01) 
suggesting that individual autonomy, even if it affects negatively team participation, 0.9144 
in model 3, it is an important tool to be considered in the second part of our analysis, as a 
potential determinant of perceived advancement prospects.  
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Table 3: Variables influencing team participation 
Variables          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3 
1. Primary education  1.2014      (0.1809) 1.2298      (0.2053) 1.1679       (0.2025) 
2. Lower secondary education 1.4313**    (0.2112) 1.0336      (0.1708) 0.9674       (0.1663) 
3. Upper secondary education 1.7321***   (0.2517) 1.1701      (0.1916) 1.0467       (0.1783) 
4. Post-secondary education 2.3276***   (0.3490) 1.4030**   (0.2379) 1.2672       (0.2234) 
5. Tertiary education-first level 2.3838***   (0.3543) 1.4542**   (0.2434) 1.2445       (0.2166) 
6. Tertiary education-advanced level 2.3273***   (0.3984) 1.5669**   (0.3001) 1.2882       (0.2562) 
7. Tenure 1.0077***   (0.0017) 1.0065***  (0.0018) 1.0009       (0.0019) 
8. Age  0.9895***   (0.0013) 0.9850***  (0.0015) 0.9866***   (0.0016) 
9. Gender 1.1034***   (0.0318) 1.0935***  (0.0361) 1.0590*     (0.0363) 
10. Individual autonomy 0.8898***   (0.0111) 0.8799***  (0.0121) 0.9144***   (0.0131) 
11. Legislators and managers 1.2769***   (0.0801) 1.2558***  (0.0894) 1.3375***   (0.0984) 
12. Professionals 1.4246***   (0.0833) 1.1787**   (0.0805) 1.0782       (0.0764) 
13. Technicians  1.6091***   (0.0850) 1.3682***  (0.0845) 1.3025***   (0.0839) 
14. Clerks 1.0563       (0.0548) 0.9544      (0.0571) 0.8714**    (0.0543) 
15. Services workers 1.1550***   (0.0596) 1.1132*     (0.0681) 1.1278*     (0.0721) 
16. Agriculture workers and fishermen 0.8909       (0.0727) 0.9316      (0.1083) 1.1106       (0.1336) 
17. Craftsmen 1.7435***   (0.0911) 1.3287***  (0.0812) 1.3491***   (0.0859) 
18. Plants and machine operators 1.2095***   (0.0730) 0.9465      (0.0646) 0.8730*      (0.0621) 
19. Armed forces 3.3150***   (0.7194) 2.6154***  (0.5958) 1.9004***   (0.4431) 
20. Small enterprise  - - 2.0800***   (0.0790) 
21. Medium enterprise - - 2.1441***   (0.0947) 
22. Large enterprise  - - 2.8885***   (0.1574) 
10 Industry dummies No Yes Yes 
30 Country dummies  No Yes Yes 
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Number of observations 24230 21957 21234 
LR chi2 778.03 1651.90 2215.94 
Pseudo R2 0.0239 0.0564 0.0783 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses 
* p<.1 
**p<.05     
***p<.01 
 
Part 2:  Teams and Career Advancement 
       In the second stage of our analysis we focus on the drivers of promotions, others than 
productivity, as perceived by employees from the European Union. In table 4 we report the 
descriptive statistics and correlations among team affiliation, perceived career prospects and 
individual autonomy in the form of freedom over the methods of work, order of tasks and 
speed of work. Results indicate that perceived career opportunity is 2.6082 (this variable 
ranges from 1 to 5) suggesting that employees perceive they have possibilities of promotion 
below average. With respect to individual autonomy, respondents present high discretion 
especially over the speed of work (0.7210 from 1), but also over their methods (0.6880) and 
order of tasks (0.6644). As for correlations, in table 4 we report significant correlations 
between all the variables.  
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Table 4:  Descriptive statistics and correlations (Part II) 
Variable N Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1.Team 
Affiliation 
 
24706 0.5978 0.4903 1     
2. Career 
Opportunity 
 
24508 2.6082 1.2400 0.0895* 1    
3.Freedom over  
Methods of 
work 
 
25009 0.6880 0.4633 -0.0287* 0.1170* 1   
4. Freedom 
over order of 
tasks 
 
25003 0.6644 0.4722 -0.0381
* 
0.1315
* 
0.5562
* 
1  
5. Freedom 
over  Speed of 
work 
24984 0.7210 0.4485 -0.0418
* 
0.0937
* 
0.4883
* 
0.4576
* 
1 
*Significant correlations using Spearman test correspond to p<.05 
        
       Once inside the team we want to analyze which variables influence employee 
perception regarding career advancement prospects. In first part of this research we found 
that education level, tenure and employee discretion have a significant influence on team 
participation.  Furthermore, in a team setting, employees have individual characteristics like 
education, tenure and individual discretion but they are also endowed with team autonomy. 
This paper explores group discretion in the form of the choice of the team over both the 
division of tasks and the team leader.  
       Table 5 examines the influence of these factors on perceived advancement prospects by 
considering three models. Model 1 presents the influence of the education and tenure, 
model 2 adds the role of team affiliation, while model 3 focuses on both employee 
characteristics and team discretion. Results from an ordered logistic regression analysis 
show that the influence of team affiliation on career advancement is positive and 
significant, its coefficient being 1.1848 (p<.01), and thus as predicted by hypothesis 1. 
Moreover, in all three models higher education influences positively promotion probability, 
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the coefficients being higher for tertiary education-advanced level, with values of 2.8173, 
3.2924 and 2.5200 respectively (p<.01). These findings confirm hypothesis 2a. As for 
hypothesis 2b, we note that the coefficients for tenure are not significant in any model 
suggesting that this hypothesis is not supported. Remember that hypothesis 3 connected 
individual autonomy to high perceived career prospects. The value of its coefficient in 
model 3 is 1.2162, significant at p<.01, confirming our expectations. What is interesting to 
observe is the behavior of team discretion which consists of two independent variables: the 
choice of the team over the division of tasks (hypothesis 4a) and the choice of the team over 
the team leader (hypothesis 4b). Even if the coefficient of the division of tasks is positive 
(1.0245), it is not significant for career advancement. This suggests that team members do 
not associate their freedom over the division of tasks with career opportunities, most likely 
because this autonomy does not favor anyone in particular. If the whole group enjoys this 
discretion, no one is differentiated from a managerial stand-point. On the other hand, as 
predicted by hypothesis 4b, the freedom of choice over who will lead the team has a 
positive and significant effect on promotions, as expected. Its coefficient, 1.1554 (p<.01) is 
higher than the coefficient of the division of tasks 1.0245 and reflects the importance of this 
decision: having the freedom to choose a team leader from the group increases the 
probability of one’s promotion as a type of self-fulfilling prophecy. When employees have 
control over who will lead their team, which is a synonym for who will be promoted, they 
also control their own career prospects. Managers should be careful when endowing teams 
with this type of discretion as personal interests or small groups of influence inside the team 
can prevail over objective stand points as skills, merits and productivity.  
         With respect to the control variables we note that age has a negative effect on 
perceived promotion probability in all three models suggesting that older employees 
perceive less career prospects (0.9723, 0.9729 and 0.9730, respectively at p<.01), while 
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gender indicates that men perceive themselves with more opportunities compared to women 
(the coefficient of gender is higher than one and significant at p<.01 in all models). As for 
job title, employees with higher status (i.e. managers, professionals, and technicians), 
clerks, craftsmen, service workers and respondents from armed forces, consider having 
more career opportunities than employees from elementary occupations. Also employees 
working in larger companies enjoy significantly more prospects than the ones from micro 
enterprises, the coefficient of large size being 1.1210 significant at p<.05 in model 1, 
1.1012 significant at p<.05 in model 2 and 1.1590 respectively in model 3, significant at 
p<.01.  
 
Table 5a: Team-members and Career Advancement: 
Variables                Model  1                   Model  3 
1. Team Affiliation Yes Yes 
2. Individual autonomy -      1.2162*** (0.0197) 
3. Team decides the division of tasks -      1.0245     (0.0368) 
4. Team decides the team leader -      1.1554*** (0.0446) 
5. Primary education    1.1747       (0.2779)      1.1382     (0.2753) 
6. Lower secondary education   1.3928       (0.3250)      1.3798     (0.3290) 
7. Upper secondary education   1.6108       (0.3726)      1.5453*    (0.3650) 
8. Post-secondary education   1.9579***   (0.4615)      1.8691***  (0.4501) 
9. Tertiary education-first level   2.2144***   (0.5186)      2.0040***  (0.4795) 
10. Tertiary education-advanced level   2.8173***   (0.7133)      2.5200***  (0.6522) 
11. Tenure   1.0003       (0.0020)      0.9983      (0.0021) 
12. Age    0.9723***   (0.0017)      0.9730***  (0.0018) 
13. Gender   1.3920***   (0.0511)      1.3399***   (0.0505) 
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14. Legislators and managers   3.3244***   (0.2724)      2.9828***  (0.2531) 
15. Professionals   2.4453***   (0.1862)      2.2267***   (0.1748) 
16. Technicians    2.2082***   (0.1550)      2.0913***  (0.1510) 
17. Clerks   2.0251***   (0.1448)      1.9077*** (0.1403) 
18. Services workers   1.4904***   (0.1078)      1.4527***  (0.1085) 
19. Agriculture workers and fishermen   0.9486       (0.1407)      0.8371      (0.1303) 
20. Craftsmen   1.1877**    (0.0802)      1.1656**   (0.0808) 
21. Plants and machine operators   0.9219       (0.0724)      0.9735      (0.0785) 
22. Armed forces   2.6162***   (0.5031)      2.8529***  (0.5572) 
23. Small enterprise    0.9718       (0.0406)      0.9943       (0.0428) 
24. Medium enterprise   0.9847       (0.0464)      1.0343       (0.0503) 
25. Large enterprise    1.1210**    (0.0611)      1.1590***    (0.0650) 
10 Industry dummies Yes Yes 
30 Country dummies  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 13089 12467 
LR chi2 1982.65 2090.75 
Pseudo R2 0.0492 0.0545 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses 
* p<.1 
**p<.05     
***p<.01 
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Table 5b: Employees and Career Advancement in the European Union: 
Variables               Model  2 
1. Team Affiliation      1.1848***  (0.0320) 
2. Individual autonomy - 
3. Team decides the division of tasks - 
4. Team decides the team leader - 
5. Primary education       1.4180**      (0.2261)    
6. Lower secondary education      1.7052***   (0.2692) 
7. Upper secondary education      1.8993***   (0.2973)  
8. Post-secondary education      2.3218***   (0.3735)  
9. Tertiary education-first level      2.7046***   (0.4312) 
10. Tertiary education-advanced level      3.2924***   (0.5856) 
11. Tenure      1.0022       (0.0016) 
12. Age       0.9729***   (0.0013)   
13. Gender      1.3887***    (0.0401) 
14. Legislators and managers      3.0222***    (0.1904) 
15. Professionals      2.8027***    (0.1686) 
16. Technicians       2.4219***   (0.1323) 
17. Clerks      1.9815***   (0.1063) 
18. Services workers      1.6259***   (0.0897) 
19. Agriculture workers and fishermen      1.2326*      (0.1329) 
20. Craftsmen      1.3308***   (0.0713) 
21. Plants and machine operators      0.9293       (0.0563) 
22. Armed forces      2.4390***   (0.4123)  
23. Small enterprise       0.9979       (0.0325) 
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24. Medium enterprise      0.9725       (0.0364) 
25. Large enterprise       1.1012**    (0.0491) 
10 Industry dummies Yes 
30 Country dummies  Yes 
Number of observations 20874 
LR chi2 3263.14 
Pseudo R2 0.0510 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses 
* p<.1 
**p<.05     
***p<.01 
 
 
   Discussion and Conclusions 
         The objective of this paper was to investigate the relationship between team affiliation 
and career advancement prospects by carefully examining both the antecedents and 
consequences of team participation. In order to overcome the contradictory results from the 
literature my research proposes to study the direct effects of education (i.e. highest degree 
certification), tenure (as the number of years spent in the present organization) and 
employee discretion on perceived career prospects while controlling for specific individual 
and contextual characteristics. 
          Several important findings emerge from this research.  First, the majority of our 
hypotheses are supported suggesting that education and tenure are important for team 
affiliation and promotions, while autonomy has a critical role when it comes to assessing 
employee perceived career advancement prospects. In the first part of the analysis I focus 
on the individual characteristics that determine team formation beyond employee 
performance. The prediction of the positive coefficient of both education and tenure from 
models 1 and 2 confirms, as expected by the employee learning theory, that a high 
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education level and a high tenure inside a company lead to increased probability of being 
part of a team. Managers may prefer to select team-members who are highly educated or 
have a large history and experience with the organization in order to be able to share their 
information and knowledge with other employees or newcomers.  
          In the second part of this research, I analyze which factors, individual or group 
characteristics, may affect perceived career advancement prospects. In a team setting, my 
research proposes that employee’s level of education, tenure and autonomy- at both 
individual and team level- can influence promotions. Results offer support for all the 
hypotheses except hypothesis 2b and hypothesis 4a, suggesting that team affiliation, 
individual autonomy, higher education and team discretion in the form of team freedom 
over the choice of the group leader contribute to high career prospects as expected, while 
tenure and team decision over the division of tasks have no significant influence on 
perceived promotion opportunities. The implication regarding attaining further education is 
in line with findings from Arrow (1972), Spilerman & Lunde (1991) and Chao & Ngai 
(2001) which consider education credential as an important signal about employee level of 
competence.  
          Furthermore, when used simultaneously in the same regression, individual autonomy 
and team autonomy, the former tends to rule out the effect of team autonomy in the form of 
team members´ choices upon the division of tasks. The explanation could be that employees 
who work in a team perceive individual autonomy as a more powerful determinant of career 
advancement and consider discretion over the division of tasks as insignificant. On the 
other hand, autonomy to choose the team leader is found positive and significant even for 
employees who enjoy high individual discretion, signaling that potential own interests are at 
stake: regarding team leader position as career advancement people may value more their 
possibility to choose one person among themselves. 
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         However, some limitations should be noted. First, this research is a cross-sectional 
analysis. It would be interesting to study if the findings are reliable if we conduct a time 
series analysis. The second limitation of this study is due to data availability: the survey 
does not offer information about actual promotions, the data presenting only employee 
perceptions on their career advancement prospects. For future research it would be 
interesting to measure actual promotions and compare the results with the findings 
corresponding to the perceived job opportunities. Another direction for future research 
would be to investigate the role of team affiliation as a moderator of the relationship 
between education level and career advancement. It may be that high education facilitates 
promotions as a signal for productivity but being part of a group can attenuate the negative 
influence of low education on promotions. 
          To conclude, the estimated results from this research shed light in understanding the 
strong relation between various employee characteristics, the job design and perceived job 
opportunities. Starting with a comprehensive analysis of the antecedents of team affiliation, 
this paper finds that being part of a team, having high education, and enjoying both 
individual autonomy and group discretion lead to the perception of higher career prospects. 
Limitations aside, the study does contribute to an understanding of how managers should 
allocate employees to teams (i.e. considering the benefits of learning and sharing) and once 
inside the group, which tools should they use in order to keep the workers motivated. 
Endowing employees with autonomy, at both individual and group level, is a signal of 
empowerment which elevates expectations while it brings a sense of control over one’s 
work and even job title, in the case of team freedom of choice over who will lead the group.  
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Appendix  
 
Table 1A.Variable definition and structure in Chapter 1: 
 Variable Name             Definition How it becomes operational        Expected effects 
Age (agenormal) The age of the respondent 
measured in years 
 
Control variable with real values from 15 
to 99 years.  
-uses variable hh2b from the survey 
 
Controlling for age we can see 
how the dependent variable 
evolves 
- individual 
Sex (newsex) The gender of the respondent Dummy variable with value 0 for woman 
and 1 for man.  
-uses variable hh2a from the survey 
Controlling for sex we can see 
how the dependent variable 
evolves 
-individual 
Autonomy: 
-Individual Autonomy 
(at2) 
-team-level autonomy 
(autoteam1) 
-individual autonomy (at2) 
describes the extent to which the 
respondent has autonomy in 
decision-making about his own 
work:  
-at2 is an index that comprises 
three variables which the employee 
can control: his methods of work, 
the order of tasks and the speed of 
his work 
-autoteam1 describes whether or 
not the team can decide by itself 
the division of tasks 
Moderator variables  
-with at2 is expected that if the employee 
can decide upon his methods of work, 
the order of tasks and the speed of work 
he will be more satisfied 
-at2 is a standardized index variable 
which represents the mean of three 
dummy variables: methods of work, the 
order of tasks and the speed of work. It 
uses variable q24a,b,c from the survey 
- autoteam1 uses variable q26b_1a from 
the survey 
We expect that the more 
autonomy a worker or a team 
has in decision-making the 
stronger the relationship 
between the compensation type 
and job satisfaction. 
 
Nationality (country) The respondent country of origin Dummy variables with values for  the 
nationality of the respondent 
-uses variable country from the survey 
Controlling for heterogeneity in 
nationality  
- contextual 
Type of Industry (ind) In which industry activates our 
respondent  
Dummy variable for different industries 
-uses variable nace11 from the survey 
Control variable 
- contextual 
Job Tenure /experience 
(tenure) 
Number of years a respondent has 
been employed in his/her present 
main job 
Control variable with values in  real 
years at the current company 
-uses variable q2d from the survey 
 
 
Control variable  
- individual 
Type of Compensation The type of compensation that the 
employee receives 
Independent variable with vales: 
-Individual performance pay (IPP): 
variable ef6b from the survey 
-Payment based on the overall 
performance of a group (TBR): variable 
ef6h from the survey 
-combined salary: IPP & TBR => uses 
variables ef6b and ef6h 
Independent variable 
- IPP decrease job satisfaction 
- payment based on the overall 
performance of a group increase 
job satisfaction  
Education (edu) The highest level of education 
completed by the employee   
Dummy variables for 7 different levels 
of education 
-uses variable isced from the survey 
 
Control variable 
-individual 
Task Interdependence (ta) The pace of work of an employee 
depends on the work done by his 
colleagues 
Moderator variable 
-dummy variable with value 1 if the pace 
of work of an employee depends on the 
work done by his colleagues and 0 
otherwise 
-uses variable q21a from the survey 
 
High task interdependence 
influences negatively employee 
satisfaction  
Size of the organization 
(size) 
Number of employees in the  
company 
Dummy variables for 7 different sizes 
-uses question q6 
Control variable 
- organizational 
 
Salary Average net monthly income Dummy variable for 10 different income 
levels 
-uses question ef5 from the survey 
Control variable 
- individual 
Employee Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Pay satisfaction of team members: 
“I am well paid for the work I do” 
Categorical variable, which uses a scale 
from 1 to 5, 1 meaning that the employee 
strongly disagrees which this affirmation  
2 that he or she disagrees, 3 neither agree 
nor disagree  with the affirmation, 4 he 
or she agrees and 5 strongly agrees  
-uses variable q37b from the survey 
Dependent variable 
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Table 2A.Variable definition and structure in Chapter 2: 
 
Variable Name       Definition How it becomes operational   Expected effects 
Age 
The age of the respondent 
measured in years 
 
Control variable with real values from 15 
to 99 years. 
-uses variable hh2b from the survey 
Control variable , individual 
Gender The gender of the respondent 
Dummy variable with value 0 for woman 
and 1 for man. 
-uses variable hh2a from the survey 
Control variable, individual 
Autonomy: 
-Individual Autonomy 
(indivauto) 
-team-level autonomy 
(ateam) 
-indivauto is an index that 
comprises three variables 
which the employee can 
control: his methods of work, 
the order of tasks and the 
speed of his work 
-ateam describes whether or 
not the team can decide by 
itself the division of tasks 
 
-indivauto is an index variable which 
represents the combination of three 
dummy variables: methods of work, the 
order of tasks and the speed of work. It 
uses variable q24a,b,c from the survey 
- ateam uses question q26b_1a from the 
survey: “Do the members of the team 
decide by themselves on the division of 
tasks?” 
Independent variables with team 
autonomy moderator in H5 
-We expect autonomy to increase  
assistance received in teams 
 
Country 
The country where the survey 
is taken 
Dummy variables with values for  the 
country of interview for the respondent 
-uses variable country from the survey 
Control variable, contextual 
Type of Industry (ind) 
In which industry activates our 
respondent 
Dummy variable for different industries 
-uses variable nace11 from the survey 
Control variable, contextual 
Job Tenure  
(tenure) 
Number of years a respondent 
has been employed at his/her 
present company 
Control variable with values in  real years 
at the current company 
-uses variable q2d from the survey 
Control variable, individual 
Piece Rates (PR) 
Piece rates or other 
productivity payments 
Dummy variable with 1 for PR, 0 
otherwise  
-uses ef6b from the survey 
Independent variable  
- We expect to decrease the help 
received 
Size of the 
organization 
(size) 
Number of employees in the 
company 
Dummy variables for 7 different sizes 
-uses variable q6 
Control variable, organizational 
Occupation Job title 
Dummy variable with for 10 different 
categories of occupation 
-uses variable isco from the survey 
Control variable, individual 
Employee Helping 
Behaviour 
The amount of assistance 
received by team-members 
Categorical variable 
-uses a 5-point Likert scale from 1= 
“strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly 
agree”  
-uses variable q25a from the survey: “You 
can get assistance from colleagues if you 
ask for it.” transformed so that value 5 
represents help received almost always 
Dependent variable 
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Table 3A.Variable definition and structure in Chapter 3: 
Variable Name       Definition How it becomes operational   Expected effects 
Age 
The age of the respondent 
measured in years 
 
Control variable with real values from 15 
to 99 years. 
-uses variable hh2b from the survey 
Control variable , individual 
Country 
The country where the survey 
is taken 
Dummy variables with values for  the 
country of interview for the respondent 
-uses variable country from the survey 
Control variable, contextual 
Education 
The highest level of education 
attainment of the employee 
Dummy variable with values from 0 to 6 
for the level of education.  
-uses variable isced from the survey 
Control variable, individual and 
independent variable in H2a 
Gender The gender of the respondent 
Dummy variable with value 0 for woman 
and 1 for man. 
-uses variable hh2a from the survey 
Control variable, individual 
Job Tenure  
(tenure) 
Number of years a respondent 
has been employed at his/her 
present company 
Control variable with values in  real years 
at the current company 
-uses variable q2d from the survey 
Control variable, individual and 
independent varible in H2b 
Occupation Job title 
Dummy variable with for 10 different 
categories of occupation 
-uses variable isco from the survey 
Control variable, individual 
Size of the 
organization 
(size) 
Number of employees in the 
company 
Dummy variables for 7 different sizes 
-uses variable q6 
Control variable, organizational 
Type of Industry (ind) 
In which industry activates our 
respondent 
Dummy variable for different industries 
-uses variable nace11 from the survey 
Control variable, contextual 
Autonomy: 
-Individual Autonomy 
(indivauto) 
-team-level autonomy 
(ateam) 
- team-level autonomy 
(tl) 
-indivauto is an index that 
comprises three variables 
which the employee can 
control: his methods of work, 
the order of tasks and the 
speed of his work 
-ateam describes whether or 
not the team can decide by 
itself the division of tasks 
-tl describes whether or not 
team-members can decide who 
will lead their team 
 
-indivauto is an index variable which 
represents the combination of three 
dummy variables: methods of work, the 
order of tasks and the speed of work. It 
uses variable q24a,b,c from the survey 
- ateam uses question q26b_1a from the 
survey: “Do the members of the team 
decide by themselves on the division of 
tasks?” with possible answers Yes and No 
- tl uses the question q26b_1b from the 
survey: “Do the members of the team 
decide by themselves who will be head of 
the team? “with possible answers Yes and 
No 
Independent variables  
-We expect autonomy to increase  
career advancement prospects 
 
Team Participation 
Shows whether or not 
employees work in teams 
Dummy variable showing if employees 
work in teams or not 
-uses question q26b from the survey:  
“Does your job involve doing all or part 
of your work in a team?” 
Independent variable  
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Career Advancement 
Prospects (CAP) 
Posibility of promotion inside 
the organization 
Categorical variable 
-uses a 5-point Likert scale from 1= 
“strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly 
agree”  
-uses variable q37c from the survey: “My 
job offers good prospects for career 
advancement.”  
Dependent variable 
 
 
 
